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ABSTRACT
The term ‘God’ may be understood as the desire for the complete epistemological
condition of thought; language expresses this condition in statements of ‘meaning.’
‘Religion’ expresses this desire in texts and ritual practice which may be examined by in
academic study; however, because the ‘third term’ of religio is understood as the
condition of being ‘bounded to or by,’ the study of religion is itself bounded to or by this
desire for the completion of thought. This desire cannot be understood as an ‘alterity’ of
thought but is rather the internal native or ‘alter-native’ condition of thought itself.
Religions are the native residences of this desire, and claim to know the complete
condition; however, alter-natively, because thought cannot completely restrict but rather
remains itself an expression of the condition, human thought and its culture are open to
an unrestricted examination of the expressions of the condition. Each religion expresses
itself as a ‘singularity’ of this universal condition of thought; however, because of the
native factors in the epistemological condition, specifically, that thought desires but
cannot fully express or know the condition, no particular religion can claim hegemony to
the expression of the condition: ‘God’ as such is the full expression of thought, yet by
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the definition of the terms of thought, its expression remains fully its alter-native
exception of thought.
The thesis first considers the possibility of theory itself through a brief
examination of etymological gaps and windows evident in its expression.

Next, we

examine a possible working theory for the study of religion and the epistemological
implications arising from its expression. Thirdly, as a result of these two courses, we
examine the semantic and semiotic conditions of what can be ‘called’ ‘meaning.’ The
thesis concludes with proposed epistemological strategies for the study of culture and
religion, including what are termed the eccentric semantic and semiotic loops, the
potentiation of meaning in the instantiation and disinstantiation of language figurations,
singularity in meaning expressions, and the unique singularity of religious meaning in
what may be termed the “exceptional inception” of thought.
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I.

Introduction of the Thesis
Our thesis will consider the following propositions:
1. The term ‘God’ may be understood as the desire for the complete
epistemological condition of thought; language expresses this condition in
statements of ‘meaning.’
2. ‘Religion’ expresses this desire in texts and ritual practice which may be
considered in academic study; however, because the ‘third term’ of religio
is understood as the condition of being ‘bounded to or by,’ the study of
religion is itself bounded to this desire for the completion of thought.
3. This desire for the complete epistemological condition of thought cannot
be understood as an ‘alterity’ of thought but is rather the internal native or
‘alter-native’ condition of thought itself.
4. Religions are the native residences of this desire to know the complete
condition; however, alter-natively, because thought cannot completely
restrict this condition but remains itself an expression of the condition,
human thought and its culture are open to an unrestricted examination of
the expressions of the condition.
5. Each religion expresses itself as a ‘singularity’ of this universal condition
of thought; however, because of the native factors in the epistemological
condition, specifically, that thought desires but cannot fully express the
condition, no particular religion can claim hegemony to the expression of
the condition: ‘God’ as such is the full expression of thought, yet by the
1

definition of the terms of thought, its expression remains fully its alternative excess of thought.
Our examination of the propositions will proceed along the following course:
1. First, because of the theoretical nature of the propositions, we will enter
the study through a consideration of the problem of ‘theory’ itself, and
specifically the problems that arise from the expression of what we mean
by theory in the terms and statements of language. As such we will enter
the epistemological problem of thought through the portal of language.
2. Secondly, we will examine a possible working theory for the study of
religion itself and the epistemological implications and problems that arise
from its consideration.
3. Thirdly, because of the discoveries from the first two courses, we will then
more carefully examine the semantic and semiotic conditions of what we
call ‘meaning.’
4. Finally, we will conclude with proposed epistemological strategies for the
study of culture and religion. These strategies include what we term the
eccentric semantic and semiotic loops, the potentiation of meaning in the
instantiation and disinstantiation of language structures, singularity in
meaning expressions, and the unique singularity of religious meaning in
what we term the exceptional inception.

2

While we consider the thought of many theorists, Gilles Deleuze’s transcendental
empiricism appears to offer the strongest theoretical basis for the concepts we want to
introduce to the discourse of religious studies. In our reading, Deleuze’s thought appears
to be capable of returning philosophical theory from its coursings in the illusive
expectation of historical progress back to theory itself. It appears to be particularly
rooted in the careful empirical meta-analysis of thought as thought emerges to itself from
the play of not only language but more importantly from what we will attempt to develop
from his concept of the passive genesis as the energetics of meaning. Moreover, his
development of discordant harmony in the epistemological analysis of the meaning
register allows for the concept of the singularity of meaning which we attempt to develop
for religious studies as the exceptional inception of the religious vision of the real. And
exactly because of his discovery of the intrinsic discordance and disjunction of the
figuration of thought, his theory offers the unique ability to decipher the contemporary
crises of meaning which emanate from the collision of traditional cultures with the
cultures of the so-called modern and post-modern.

3

II.

A brief deconstruction of the approach to “theory”
How might we consider a theory of religion and …religion(s)…the religious?”

Let us first briefly consider the possibility of theory in the following formula: “Theory
asserts a highly self-critical working hypothesis which enables the consideration of the
terms and conditions and possible heuristic modes or structures of intelligibility and
meaning of a field of inquiry, a problem, or a problematic.” We may briefly consider
the terms of the hypothesis:
“Theory asserts…”: “Theory” must first acknowledge that it begins with an
implicit or explicit approach, that is it carries to the scene of the examination an intrinsic
point of view and a system of values (including, and in particular, as in the case of
phenomenology, where the approach asserts an ability to “bracket,” to use its native
term) of the object of study. “Theory” moreover brings an assumed semantic meaning to
the scene. On the one hand, “theory” appears to originate etymologically not as the
construction of hypotheses but rather as the act of “viewing” or “seeing.”1
However, more contemporary use of the term clearly indicates an operation that has
moved well beyond the sensibility of “seeing” or “viewing” toward a more fully
developed ideational presentation, or re-presentation of the object of study. “Theory” in
its modern expression denotes a “set of statements or principles devised to explain a

1

Late Latin theoria, from Greek theoria, from theoros, spectator : probably thea, a viewing + -oros, seeing (from
horan, to see) The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by
Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved;
thefreedictionary.com.
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group of phenomena…explanatory statements…methods of analysis…a set of
theorems…a belief or principle that guides action or assists comprehension…”2 Our
approach to the “study of…” carries with it both a “seeing” sensibility as well as what
appears to be a much more highly developed reasoned set of attitudes and principles:
both “sense” as seeing (but presumably the full range of the senses) as well as the
statement or assertion of a more systematic set of rules or principles appears to engage
theoretical study.
“a highly self-critical…”: Further, we are asserting that our theory must project
a self-critical attitude. That is, theory, to jump to our next term, must also work on itself.
“…working hypothesis…”: Theory “works, it is a working through, both on
itself and on its object of study

Yet if we acknowledge that an hypothesis is already

formulated as we discovered above, then we are already asserting that we can study
religion and culture at all. The term “hypothesis” therefore denotes: “1. A tentative
explanation for an observation, phenomenon, or scientific problem that can be tested by
further investigation; 2. Something taken to be true for the purpose of argument or
investigation; an assumption; 3. The antecedent of a conditional statement.”3

The

etymology of the term is rooted in the Greek “hupotithenai,” derived from “hupothe”

2

Ibid.

3

The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin
Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company; thefreedictionary.com.
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meaning “to suppose” and “tithenai” meaning “to place.”4 Theory or hypothesis is thus
already supposing possible angles of approach, and it is already placing or situating such
an approach in relation to the project of study: it is already “working.”
“…which enables the consideration…”:

Working theory should enable or

mobilize investigation. Theory is already carried by a momentum of curiosity. Also, the
term “consideration” denotes “…to think carefully about…to esteem…to look at
thoughtfully.”5 Here we note intrinsic values of inquiry, i.e., a value system which
acknowledges “care.” However the etymology of the term “consider” derives from the
Latin consīderāre, which means “to contemplate the stars.”6 “Consider” thus implies a
curiosity to study or account for a more extreme horizon of inquiry.
“…the terms and conditions and possible heuristic modes or structures of
intelligibility and meaning…”:

Theory in the humanities thus acknowledges the

uniquely semantic or linguistic and textual nature of its inquiry, as this brief interrogation
suggests. The word “term” denotes both a word structure but also a temporal condition,
as in a term or period of time, and thus indicates an inception and a “term-inus” of the
study.7 As noted above, we are already “placed” in a space of hypothesis, and the
“terms” of the inquiry also indicate the temporal condition of the inquiry. Theoretical
inquiry originates from this conjugation of a primary equation, that is, from both the
4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.

6

Walter W. Skeat, A Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, New York: Perigee books, 1980, pp.
107-108.

7

The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language.
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temporality of the “seen” or “observed” but also from the term-inologies and statements.
That is, in addition to its temporal meaning, the word “term” implicates language in the
equation in two ways. First, term indicates “a. A word or group of words having a
particular meaning….” and second, term indicates “b. …language of a certain kind;
chosen words…”8
In our consideration, item b will pertain to the semantic condition, that is the
particular choice of language, the set of terms and then the consequent word-usage
germane to the field of study. This semantic condition imparts from the term of the
equation inquirer/inquired in that the primary temporal/spatial equation implies the
interaction of the inquirer and the field of inquiry, and the semantic field which arises
from this equation assumes a consequent interaction of the set of terms and terminology
in the secondary language event that ensues from the “seeing”: a semantic texture holds
in both the primary term (its term or time, and, presumably also the place or site of this
interaction) as well as the secondary terms which express it. The text of the inquiry can,
more or less, be a favorable or accurate expression or re-presentation of the act of seeing
or observation. Item a, however, would appear to reach beyond either the initial semantic
equation of observation or expression. That is, “meaning” implies yet another level of
the inquiry which we will term the semiotic condition. Here we must observe that the
“term” of the semiotic equation is not merely its interactive structure or “surface”, though
this is implied – i.e., as we have observed the primary semantic observational interaction
of the inquirer/inquired and the secondary semantic interactive structure of language are
8

Ibid.
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required to approach this latent semiotic condition. What is implied and carried by this
semantic condition as well as what is implied and what in fact also carries the semantic
condition itself, however, is the more problematic assumption of the signs and symptoms
of “meaning”, or, in the terms of our formula, the “…possible heuristic modes or
structures of intelligibility and meaning”. “Intelligibility” implies the following: “1.
Capable of being understood…; 2. Capable of being apprehended by the intellect alone.”9
“Capable of being understood…apprehended” already implies the capacity of
understanding, and as further implied in its root, intellegere – to perceive, it implies the
capacity to “perceive” the object of study, to interface with it, to observe it, but then to
perceive it in a way that is “apprehended” or “understood.” Or, as its Latin root legere or
lectum implies, “to choose, to pick.” As Joseph Shipley observes, “From the ability to
choose the proper letters came the derived meaning of legere, to read: what is legible is
what can be picked out.”10 Shipley goes on:
Few words have more ramifications in English than this Latin one. A group of
men picked out for military service is a legion; then, any large number; men
chosen may be a legation, or legates. That which is chosen tends to become
imposed, hence, legal, lawful: and through Old French leiel, from Latin legalis
comes its doublet, English loyal. …To choose together is to make a collection
(Latin col, from com, together). To choose among, to discriminate, is to show
intelligence (Latin intelligere, intellectum, from intellegere, from inter, between
+ legere), or to be intellectual.
…Closely bound with this verb – for what you choose, you seek to hold, to bind
– is Latin ligare, whence Italian legare, to bind…11

9

Ibid, “Middle English, from Old French, from Latin intellegibilis, intelligibilis, from intellegere, to perceive”

10

Joseph T. Shipley, Dictionary of Word Origins, Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1979, 211.

11

Ibid.
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“Intelligibility” thus carries multiple usages: that is, it first implies understanding, i.e., to
perceive or apprehend; next it implies a reading, from its root legere, to choose but also
to “read”; and finally, from its etymological connection to ligare, it implies “to bind” or
“be bounded to” which we note is also the root for the term “religion.” We will suggest
that there is a subtle and obscure but crucial distinction rooted in the term intelligibility.
On the one hand, intelligibility implies understanding which ensues from the literal
semantic condition of word usage and reading; on the other hand, intelligibility implies
what we will assert is a semiotic condition of “boundedness” to “symptoms” of meaning
which exceed yet which are nonetheless expressed and bound to language.
While the term “intelligibility” and its root are complex, the terms “to mean” or
“meaning” occupy over 6 pages of the OED and further expand the scope of the inquiry.
Briefly, “to mean” carries the following three groups of reference: (1) “to have in mind,
intend. [English and Middle English menen]12 hence to express significance or intention,
to “stand for, symbolize, typify, symbolise, represent”13; (2) “common”14 but also as in
“geometric mean or arithmetic mean …the average value of a set of numbers”15; (3)
“intermediate”16 or “the middle point, state, or course between limits or extremes”17 also

12

Ibid, 321.

13

Based on WordNet 3.0, Farlex clipart collection. © 2003-2008 Princeton University, Farlex Inc.; freedictionary.com.

14

Ibid.

15

The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin
Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company; freedictionary.com.
16

Shipley, Dictionary of Word Origins, 321.

17

Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 2003; freedictionary.com.
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used extensively in economics. “Meaning” then appears to encompass a broad set of
potential usages. Initially we will assert that meaning pertains to that expression of
signification which stands “in” or “for” or emerges from the middle or medium ground
of the interaction of the inquirer and the object of inquiry. As we are discovering, the
terms in our formula appear to both express this signification and interaction yet also to
exceed it.

This excess potential appears not to be a question of “what” meaning

communicates or signifies. Rather, the more radical claim of our thesis points to “how”
meaning is potentiated at all. Furthermore, we will claim that as such any semantic
(textual) or semiotic (signs and symptoms) configuration of the registers of meaning will
be seen to emerge from a potentiating “background” which exceeds yet contains its
expressions. We will attempt to develop a concept of “meaning” which interfaces what
we have termed its expressed semantic condition in conjugation with what we have
termed its semiotic condition to account for the potential of its complete equation, and we
will further assert that this equation offers a unique challenge to the study of culture and
religion.
“…of a field of inquiry, a problem, or a problematic.”:

Finally, we

acknowledge that our approach has a design which derives not only from its own
theoretical angle of approach but also from the unique designated field or focus of
inquiry: we are examining “some-thing,” either a field of inquiry, a particular concern or
problem, or in this case a “revisioning of the registers of meaning in the study of culture
and religion.” “Field of inquiry,” however, already assumes that a “field” is open for
10

interrogation, that is that it can be subject to such a theoretical approach or a method of
examination.

This seems acceptable for the study of the natural world, as in, for

example, the categorical study and taxonomic classification of the species. We note,
however, that our “field” is designated as “culture and religion.” While this field may
indeed offer certain “empirical” indicators (for example, observable religious rituals or
religious texts) the complete field or our ability to apprehend it should remain in question
from the outset. Our assumption as to the accessibility to the “field of study” renders,
again, at least two dimensions.

On the one hand, what is assumed is the obvious

objective “field of study”: i.e., we are assuming, as from the outset, that “theory” or “the
hypothetical” can designate a specific territory of investigation, and that these territories
might be isolated and then observed or interrogated, and that they can then be rendered
into descriptive or interpretive discourse – we can designate this dimension of “field” as
the “objective field.” Yet we further note that the assumption of intelligibility as well as
the objective field of religion, rooted in ligare, imply a “boundedness to” a condition or
set of data which would seem to be exceed direct empirical accessibility or purely
descriptive expression. The unique background of culture and religion appears to be
expressed in this “bounded to” condition.
Initial Summary of the Formula
Initial observations appear to figure a ‘surface’ and a ‘depth’ level of complexity
to the terms of the formula:

11

Theory: surface text: “…set of hypothetical statements or possible angles of
intelligibility;” alternative sub-text: “the act of seeing.”
Self-criticality:

surface text:

“…assumes the availability of the study as

study…” –e.g. academic pretense; alternative sub-text:

observer’s subjective self-

awareness of the “subjectification” of the object of study.
Hypothetical: surface text: “…asserted explanation, set of explanatory “thesis or
theses;” alternative sub-text: “already placed, sited.”
Consider: surface text: “to regard, account for, form an opinion or angle of
regard for;” alternative sub-text: “see the stars.”
Terms & conditions of “meaning:” surface text: “emergent and intermediating
expression;” alternative sub-depth text: “a potentiating and excessive background.”
Field of inquiry: surface text: “actual field of study;” alternative sub-text: “the
observer’s angle of approach.”
We have pursued this brief etymological exercise merely to attempt to introduce a
“sense” of the rich but challenging complexity of any concept or theory of meaning. This
sense carries and leaves a multiplicity of terms and textures of a landscape rather than
clear and well defined maps or geographies. It appears that in each of the isolated terms
“the theoretical” presents “fields” of counter-valences or heterogeneous levels of
definition which then suggest working, interactive levels of complexity, both from within
the isolated terms of the formula as well as in possible formulations of the hypothetical
situation itself.
12

We step back and observe the terms “consider” and “terms/conditions” in the
formula. Each present both a surface (e.g., consider: “…to regard…account for…”;
terms/conditions: “…semantic arrangement…”) as well as what we might stipulate as an
“alternativity” or a “depth” (e.g., consider: “...see the stars…”; terms/conditions: “…the
meaning of…”). This sense of complexity would appear to hold in an arrangement of
subtle and accepted overdetermination.
This brief deconstructive examination of a hypothetical approach to theory results
in a complexity of meaning; we are pressured in its reading to accept a “sense” of each of
its terms separately, and furthermore to accept a momentum of the composite statement
which exceeds the immediate statement yet which is nonetheless expressed in the
statement.

13

III.

A Working Hypothesis: Rite, Text, Boundedness …
“Religion” is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars for their intellectual
purposes and therefore is theirs to define. It is a second-order, generic concept that plays the
same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as “language” plays in
linguistics or “culture” plays in anthropology. There can be no disciplined study of religion
without such a horizon.18
Our thesis – or more specifically our hypo-thesis – is that postmodern religious thought
and so-called “postmodern theology” in this age of the event has systematically and bizarrely
failed to consider the singularity behind the event from which it claims to speak – the
religious per se.19

We propose the following formula for our study:
“The academic study of culture and religion considers the texts and rituals and
possible heuristic modes or structures of intelligibility of the individual’s or a
culture’s account of the human condition and its confrontation with and
boundedness to the “divine” or the “the religious.”
A conundrum of any proposed study confronts us: Where to begin? Even our
somewhat careful introductory attempt to outline the nature of theory leaves us with the
sense that we begin already “in” a study, a situation, a “middle” of “meaning,” hence an
arrangement of signification – as observed, the “site” and “sight” and “sign” of the
hypothesis. “Text,” “ritual,” and “boundedness” will be the initial terms of our inquiry
and the middle expressions of the beginning of our discussion. We note from the outset
that this middle appears somehow “looped.” That is, the presence of the third expression
of the term “religious,” boundedness, appears to fold over or conjugate the first two
terms. The third term will be left open by intention at this stage. That is, boundedness

18

Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious”, in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor,
Chicago: U. Chicago Press, 1998, pp. 281-282.

19

Carl Raschke, Event Horizon Manuscript, unpublished, 8.
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will hold as a background in the observation of text and ritual which they would appear to
claim to be “bound to…by...” or “witness to…” the “divine.”
Etymological Concerns: Encounter with the problem of language and signification
Jonathan Z. Smith, in “Religion, Religions, Religious” notes:

“The term

‘religion’ has had a long history…its etymology is uncertain...one of three current
possibilities, that it stems from the root *leig meaning “to bind” rather than from roots
meaning “to reread” or “to be careful…”20 Three “sub-fields” within the field thus arise
from this initial etymological spectrum:
(1) “care” attending to “ritual obligations or performance”;
(2) to read or re-read, [“used by Cicero, connected with relegĕre, to read over
again”21];
(3) the act or state or condition of being connected or bound by or to (ligare: to
bind).
1 and 2 suggest surface arrangements which would seem to lend themselves to
“study.” First, “care” in the performance of the rituals, habits, and customs of religious
practice would appear to be accessible on the surface to various angles of study: e.g., the
descriptive study of a particular religious rite or the collective rites of a religion, as well
as the possible comparative study of rites of various and varying religions. Second, to
“read” or “re-read” presents both the act of what is meant by “reading/re-reading” as well

20

Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” 269.

21

OED, Compact Edition, 2481.
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as the “content” of what is read. However, we note that “reading” might still imply oral
discourse.

For example, Homeric discourse but likely every ancient religion was

mnemonically “transmitted.” The inscription of “texts” as such occurs already after the
scene of oral discourse. Then secondarily, “reading/re-reading” suggests not merely the
primary reading or presentation of a discourse but now, with the pre-fix “re-”, also
genetic to re-ligion/re-ligare, “re-reading” implies a “reading of the reading…” or
inference to the interpretation of the discourse.

These two strains of ligare appear to

have been the surface concern of “religious” studies, particularly in the attempt to
originate maps of the myriad arrangements of religious practice and then to disseminate
discussion of these arrangements in careful or disciplined descriptions, comparisons, or
interpretations.
However, as we have noted, theme 3 of ligare or ligio, “to be bound to or by”
presents a more complex problem. We suspect that it is likely carefully hidden in the
first two strategies of ligare/ligio. That is, the “care-filled” rituals or oral/inscribed texts
of a religious culture can be studied in a more empirical manner – there is “stuff” to
observe, “rites” to describe, even people to interview, and discourse text to “read.”
Moreover, reference to the telos or horizon of orientation, the goal of the rite or text,
whether the Bodhisattva, Nirvana, God, Jesus of Nazareth, The Straight Path of Islam,
redemption, etc., can be “read,” noted, and described in the context of the practiced ritual
or discourse. Indeed, even the outlined third formula above, that is “the act or state or
condition of being connected or bound by or to (ligare: to bind),” may imply that the
16

“act” or “condition” of “being connected to or by…” is in fact observable, describable,
readable.

“Study” of the third theme appears to remain in the domain of possible

empirical “data,” at least from an anthropological angle.
Curiously, J.Z. Smith will claim that “…while there is a staggering amount of
data, of phenomena, of human experience and expression that might be characterized in
one culture or another, by one criterion or another, as religious – there is no data for
religion… .”22 How is it that what appear to be observable and describable “data,” i.e.,
rite and text, are re-stated into the status of “…there is no data...”? Smith is at once (a)
carefully mapping the methodological limits of the study and (b) stipulating that this
empirical methodology, which he observes is “purely academic,” nonetheless appears to
stipulate, in its own interior academic limitations, its own “third term.” The study of
religion is thus “bounded by” text and ritual, but this interiority is itself also “bounded to”
an ulteriority, that is a data set which exceeds rite and ritual. The formula loops back on
itself. Therefore, Smith wants to expand the field of study to include what he terms the
“theological,” although he will also attempt to restrict that field as such:
I have come to believe that a prime object of study for the historian of religion
ought to be theological tradition, taking the term in its widest sense, in particular,
those elements of the theological endeavor that are concerned with canon and its
exegesis. …The task of application as well as the judgment of the relative
adequacy of particular applications to a community’s life situation remains the
indigenous theologian’s task, but the study of the process, particularly the study
of comparative systematic and exegesis, ought to become a major preoccupation
of the historian of religion.23

22

Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, xi.

23

Ibid, 43.
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Smith’s claims both address and raise a question for our study. On the one hand,
we can agree on his assertion that a history of religion is incomplete without
consideration of the “canon” (text) and its “persistent, and obsessive religious activity”
(ritualized application of the text in culture), we would counter that it is more problematic
to “bracket” the situation of revelation from the scholar’s purview. He is forwarding the
expansion of the possible field of study of the first two terms, while claiming a
phenomenological ability to limit the possible consideration of the third term to the “the
indigenous theologian’s task…” We can agree: the study of a culture’s literal text and
ritual, of its expression and more formalized interpretation and the examination of the
“character” and origin of its revelatory message will by definition remain within the
existential field of the believer and the analytical field of that culture’s theological
speakers.
However, two interior issues arise. First, the study of “the religions” as cultural
pluralities is called into question from the comparative aspect of the academic discipline.
If we intend the scope of our study to address the field of all religions and their
interaction then our theory will require a method and a conceptual framework which may
account for not merely the intra-specific (indigenous) nature of religion but must include
the inter-specific (comparative) encounters between religious cultures. Obviously, the
encounter of the possibility of an indigenous and the comparative studies of religion
occurs in their expressions in language. Secondly, we observe that the expansion of the
study of the first two terms (text, ritual) to Smith’s “theological” category has not
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removed the insinuation of the third term as internally implied in the first two. We
cannot implicate a term like the “theological tradition…in its widest sense” without a
careful and thoughtful consideration of this very “sense.” The historian of religion’s
focus notwithstanding, we suggest that it will be methodologically implausible to
effectively bracket the term in the manner Smith intends without severely constricting the
study of the first two terms themselves.

Indeed, the activities of text and ritual

“obsessively” pressure the third term de facto. “Bounded to or by,” from the expanded
focus of a theory of “…religion…religions…the religious,” appears to explicitly
implicate a working definitional third term, and moreover this third term appears to
implicitly implicate at least part of the ulterior motive and aim of the first two terms.
This sense of ulteriority is empirically observable in text and ritual and thereby cannot be
bracketed from the theoretical angle of our approach.24
Indeed, it is just this “self-critical” awareness of the academic limitations of the
angle of approach to the study which “constitutes [the student’s] primary expertise, his
foremost object of study.”25 Smith stipulates a careful academic method: “First, that the
exemplum has been well and fully understood…Second, that the exemplum be displayed
in the service of some…theory, paradigm, some fundamental question…Third, that there
be some method for explicitly relating the exemplum to the theory, paradigm, or question

24

Smith’s choice of the sub-title, ”From Babylon to Jonestown,” could not have been unintentional as it implicates not
only the historical spectrum of religion but not unsubtly its spectrum of signification – for example, what do we think
we can “mean” by religion after Jamestown?
25

Smith, Imagining Religion, xi.
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and some method for evaluating each in terms of the other.”26 So, we can affirm that
Smith’s enterprise seeks its own internal principles of bracketing and focus in order to
tightly define its approach, what Paul Ricoeur27 might reference as a “hermeneutics of
suspicion.” Nonetheless, we are suggesting that such a study uncovers in the nature and
excess of its own data a complementary “hermeneutics of expansion”28 suggested by the
theoretical field of the “bounded to or by” – and we could let Smith introduce the term
“…theological…”

–

which

appear

“…religion…religions…religious…”

necessary

to

complete

the

study

of

It is granted that these are already theoretical,

scholarly, and what Smith calls “generic concepts” which are outside the indigenous field
of historical study. Applying a generic examination, however, one not tied to a specific
religious tradition but rather to “religion” itself as an academic field, constitutes what
Smith himself terms “…a second-order generic concept that plays the same role in
establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as ‘language’ plays in linguistics
or ‘culture’ plays in anthropology. There can be no disciplined study of religion without
such a horizon.”29
We appear to have briefly considered the formula for a method of study and its
limits in approaching its data-set or field of study, yet our study remains empirically
unsatisfied because we have not as yet addressed the third term, nor have we allowed the

26

Ibid, xi-xii.
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Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage, Yale University Press, 1970.
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Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious”, pp. 281-282, my emphasis in italics.
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third term to address our method. The equation proposed by the consideration of ligare
or ligio or re-ligio has discovered but not sufficiently accounted for the full etymological
referability of its horizon of interrogation, that is the implication of its “boundedness to or
by.” And subjectively, we confess an unfulfilled “desire for …” a fuller address and
redress and accountability of this momentum and its “horizon.” Furthermore, we want to
claim that this lack arises from the equation itself, that it has empirical roots, and that it is
suggested in the etymology of the term “religion.” The focus of its scope retrenches
Smith’s equation to include an ulterior sense to the study’s concern. This concern resides
as a gap or lacunae, an aporia, in the equation of “…religion…religion(s)…the religious.”
We may have encountered what Raschke terms “…the portmanteau sense of the
Roman word religio, which classical and even some current etymologies trace to the
word ligare, to “bind” or to “bind tightly.”30 We can note the intrinsic confusion which
surrounds the etymological roots, and we can further note all three areas of focus appear
plausible for our study. What can be implied by “portmanteaus sense?”
“Gilles Deleuze, in Logic of Sense considers Lewis Carol’s use of portmanteau
words as such:
It seems then that the portmanteau word is grounded upon a strict
disjunctive synthesis. …we discover the law of the portmanteau word in
general, provided that we disengage each time the disjunction which may have
been hidden. …in Carroll’s work, we must distinguish three sorts of esoteric
words: contracting words, which perform a synthesis of succession over a single
series and bear upon the syllabic elements of a proposition or a succession of
propositions in order to extract from them their composite sense (“connection”);
circulating words, which perform a synthesis of coexistence and coordination
between two heterogeneous series and which directly and at once bear upon the
30

Raschke, Event Horizon Manuscript, unpublished, 48.
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respective senses of these series (“conjunction”); and disjunctive or portmanteau
words, which perform an infinite ramification of coexisting series and bear at
once upon words and senses, or syllabic and semiological elements
(“disjunction”). The ramifying function or the disjunctive synthesis offers the
real definition of the portmanteau word.31

Deleuze may be providing an initial hint at our problem, but our terms,
“…religion…religions…religious…” are only indirectly implied as carrying the
portmanteau sense: our terms are not Lewis Carroll portmanteau terms which combine
words but rather our terms combine and carry as portmanteau baggage possible meanings
of an indefinite data-set of terms. That is, we are noting on the one hand that ligare is
connected with “text” and “rite” and on the other hand with “binding” or “rebinding…to…or by…”, and the focus or origination of this second term remains open
and in question. The former terms offer available fields of inquiry, that is the notable (as
in “text”) or observable (as in “ritual”), which correspond to Deleuze’s use of
“contracting words which perform a synthesis of succession of propositions in order to
extract from them their composite sense (“connection”) as well as to “circulating words,
which perform a synthesis of coexistence and coordination between two heterogeneous
series and which directly and at once bear upon the respective senses of these series
(“conjunction”)…”: that is, we can stipulate, in the academic “sense”, that it is possible
to contractually agree upon a field or fields of discourse which, though continually
criticized, offer an academic and disciplined approach to a given field of study, and we
can further stipulate that this same academy, by nature of its discursive interaction, may
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Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, New York: Columbia U. Press, 2003, pp. 46-47.
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tend to agree upon, though still under the discipline’s argumentative scrutiny,
“connecting” or “synthetic” observations which serve to “perform a synthesis of
coexistence and coordination…” We encountered these “contracting” and “circulating”
conditions in our brief examination of theory, that is a ‘sense’ of theory appeared to
emerge from the set of terms even though each of the terms carried both a surface
definition as well as alternative sub-textual uses.
However, we must then observe – and it appears that this observation is, in
Deleuze’s terms, a “necessary” condition of the field of study in the contracted and
synthetic data (the “read/re-read” and the “rite”) the insinuation of the third term of religare/re-ligio, that is the “bounded to…bounded by.”

That is, observing “rite” and

“reading” in an empirical study cannot avoid including in these sub-fields the “reference
to” (“boundedness to…”) and the “referability by” (“bounded by…”) the field of study to
“what…horizon…what address or response…?”

Embedded in the contracted and

connected text there appears what Deleuze refers to above as “…an infinite ramification
of coexisting series…[that] bear at once upon words and senses, or syllabic and
semiological elements.”
We can observe that his “portmanteau term” is itself “semantic,” that is, textbound in its initial explication. Yet the meaning exceeds its textual reference: the
contracting and synthetic senses texualize sense, while the portmanteau references a
condition(s) of meaning of a single term. The meaning is not purely contracted or
synthetic but rather open to an unbounded horizon of reference. The literal semantic
23

meaning32, and we will use the term semantic to refer to the contracted and circulated use
of language, also carries an internal alternative and symptomatic condition, a semiotic
condition. The term “semiotics” itself appears to express a pivotal and seminal “sense”
as it references the approach to a concept of “meaning.” That is, “semiotics” derives
from the Greek “semeiotikos, observant of signs, significant, from semeiosis, indication,
from semeioun, to signal, to interpret as a sign, from semeion, sign, from sema”33 – in
this first sense the semiotic condition may pertain to the condition of language as a
system of signs. However, we note that partnered or alternative uses of “semiotic”
pertain at once to the interpretation of such signs on the one hand, and on the other hand
“…of or relating to symtomatology” or the symptomatological study of, in this case,
language structures.34 An epistemology of meaning appears to include both the semantic
and semiotic conditions.
As such, we will attempt to further define and expand “semiotics” to regard not
merely language or sign systems but rather to address a more comprehensive accounting
of the entire “field” of meaning and meaning systems including and in particular what
might be inferred by the symptoms of meaning, or a symtomatology of meaning. In
particular, the use of “religion” to mean “…bounded to or by…” constitutes a “condition”
or possibly an “event” of meaning rather than a specifiable reference. However, at this
32

We will use the term “semantic” in its linguistic sense, that is: “Of or relating to meaning, especially meaning in
language.” (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by
Houghton Mifflin Company; freedictionary.com)
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juncture we can note that this meaning condition carries and implies two alternative
horizons: on the one hand, systems of language, what we are denoting as the “semantic”
function, or the use of language to convey, more or less empirically, data, observable
facts, and communication in general; and, on the other hand, the “semiotic” implies both
the interpretation of what such meanings in fact mean, and more curiously how meaning
itself can imply the appearance of symptoms of meaning – thus interpretation also
implies symptomatology, or the study of the possible symptoms of meaning which hold
in excess of or appear to be only suggested by their significations. For now we carry both
senses forward, but as will be suggested further forward, both the semantic and the
semiotic conditions find themselves predicated upon “strange loops” of contingency and
dependence with one another within the visioning of our study.
For example, Deleuze, above, refers to this condition as the “…infinite
ramification of coexisting series [which] bears at once upon words and senses or syllabic
and semiological elements (“disjunction”).” The disjunctive, in “religious” studies or the
study of “religion,” appears to be at once expressed and hidden in discourse. We can
note this in the following:
“It is not a question of knowing God when the veil be lifted but of knowing Him
in the veil itself.” 35
“God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” 36

In both statements we can identify “contracting” and “circulating” functions of discourse.
All of the terms, that is, “question,” “God,” “knowing,” “veil,” or “God,” “nothing,”
35

Shaikh Ahmad Al-‘Alawī, Hikmatu-hu, Sagesse, in Lings, Martin, A Sufi Saint of the 20th Century: Shaikh Ahmad
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“conceived,” etc., are stipulated to carry contracted or agreed upon “meanings,” and
furthermore perform a more or less communally accepted or circulating function – the
delivery of the statements is on their surface “intelligible.” As such, the signs are
interpretable. Yet that which is intelligible is in fact the subversion of intelligibility itself
in the ramifying pressure of the portmanteau function. The “veil” in the first statement,
itself imaginable as an empirically observable object, now can carry and signify “God”;
the contracted, circulated terms carry the disjunctive portmanteau “term” but this carriage
is more of an implied “sense” than a specific or referable term or object; as such, the
excess sense of the statement now holds meaning more as the “symptom” of this sense
than a purely referable object. St. Anselm’s statement, already an abstraction, might be
expressed even more abstractly: “‘God’ ‘signifies’ the ‘concept’ of that which exceeds
conceptualization.”

Pure contractual notation is disjoined by the very “logical”

contracted and synthetic concept of language. Like a Zen koan, signification is disjoined
by signification. What remains is a symptomatic “sense” of the excess yet this excess is
immanently a figuration of discourse itself.
These statements, and their portmanteau interrogation, may reveal what has
become latently hidden in religious studies theory and method. That is, the contracting
and circulating discourse (e.g., the anthropological, sociological, description of rite and
ritual, or in one scholar’s reading or re-reading of a second scholar’s secondary academic
description of rite or text, etc.) has tended to override and to hide the third function
which, in contracting and circulating discourse, is in fact only latently or indirectly
26

stipulated, i.e., “…God…the religious…”

Furthermore, even when referenced, i.e.,

“God” or “Krishna,” these terms remain in their contracted and circulated status because
the portmanteau function is an alternative condition of discourse rather than explicitly or
semantically stated. “God” can be, and usually remains, particularly in a scientifically
veiled academic culture, limited to a contracted and circulated agreed upon reference.
If surface discourse is bounded in the contracted and circulating function of
discourse, then the interrogation of the portmanteau function is therefore not available to
a semantic critical strategy alone. It will rather require a complementary but tightly
defined depth semiotic. Such a depth semiotic is required to further interrogate the
function of language as a veiling phenomenon.

It would suggest that it is the

conditionality of language itself which hides and obscures the portmanteau function, that
“…seeing Him in the veil itself…” is tantamount to a semiotic rather than semantic
critique of discourse, or alternatively the semantic dismantling of the veil of the semantic.
Likewise, a depth semiotic will require a semantic discourse and will be carried on the
back of the contracted and the circulating: the depth is spoken on the surface.
Excess of the Semantic Field
The excess of the semantic field, again here limited to the use of contracted and
circulating words in propositions or statements of meaning, appears evident in our earlier
examination of the proposition for a working theory. This excess constitutes the need for
the contractual and then circulating functions themselves: the speakers must agree upon
the use of language terms, and the success of language’s circulation will turn on the
27

degree of this contractual definition and clarity, and what we will later introduce as its
“economic exchangeability.”
Contractual/Consensus:

Consensus insinuates both a linguistic and a non-

linguistic condition to the semantic condition of meaning in language.

First, the

linguistic function indicates there is agreement as to “what” a term may or may not mean:
hypothetically, the literal meaning of a term is given, considered in context, negotiated
between speakers, and then applied (circulated). But secondly, we must observe the nonlinguistic or energetic function to this semantic agreement in the form of a “will to
accept” or a “momentum/force of agreement” – contract implies a firm agreement but
contract arrived at by consensus implies a non-linguistic “will” or “force of agreement”
in order to agree upon definitional terms between speakers in discourse.
Deleuze’s employs a concept of “singularity” to pressure a structuralist
assumption of possible meaning.

This critique works from within the structuralist

assumption that meaning structures may be configured or expressed as the “signifier”
which expresses a “signified.” For Deleuze,
Structures are fields composed of at least two series or sets of conjoined but
differential singular points, for example the signifiers and signifieds of structural
linguistics; these series can only connect to produce meaning if they are traversed
by a paradoxical element, which is not something common to both series but
different from them. Difference relates to difference not through some similarity
but through difference, through a kind of resonance that Deleuze calls
“intensity.”37
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For example, terms used above such as “God” and “veil” or “God” and
“conceived,” while implying a conjunction, are conjoined rather as “differential singular
points” which on the surface appear not to carry immediate reference. “Veil” is a
garment to hide one’s face or the surface of an object, and “conceived” is an abstract term
of thought.

Neither express “God” until the expression is potentiated by their

conjunction. Yet meaning is either implied or carried by their singular expression in
what Deleuze will note is not the semantic likeness or commonality but rather the
conjunction of their difference by the force of “intensity.”

Here we can note that

intensity cannot be a semantic “structure” as such but rather intensity deploys an
energetic of force to the equation of meaning. Discussing the relation of philosophy to
differential mathematics and specifically Hoöne Wronski’s Philosophie de l’infini,
Deleuze subtly introduces three radically transformative concepts to the epistemological
equation of meaning: force, potential, and value:
...the differential is indeed pure power, just as the differential relation is a pure
element of potentiality.
A principle of complete determination corresponds to this element of
potentiality. Complete determination must not be confused with reciprocal
determination. The latter concerned the differential relations and their degrees or
varieties in the Idea which correspond to diverse forms. The former concerns the
values of a relation…38

Each concept expresses the problematic of an energetics of meaning which forces
meaning structures past a threshold of clear or cleanly definable reference. However,
Deleuze appears not be excluding structure as such, rather “reciprocal determinations” of
the signifier and signified are subsumed in the “complete determination.” The semantic
38
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condition, comprised on its surface of linguistic structures which contract and circulate
surface signification and reference, nonetheless expresses these differentiating
“structures” in an energetics of meaning. Structures are subject to a consensual will, are
only potentiated at the moment of their expression, and the meaning of any expression is
always subject to pre-existent valuation. Any abstraction to a universal basis or value for
discourse is itself possible as a potential reciprocal reference, yet such a reference is itself
subject to the energetics of the complete determination which pre-potentiates and prevalues its expression.

Rather, the expression of the universal is potentiated in the

singularity of the event of meaning, but this event is always differentiating, is always
already expressed in its value assumptions, and the event is always energized by a will
that must be in excess of the semantic event itself.
The non-linguistic “will” to accept is driven by the undecidability and
multiplicities of the linguistic condition itself: the semantic meaning frequently if not
always speaks from a multiple set of possible meanings of a term (as we observed in our
etymological analysis of the terms of general theory) as well as to multiple sets of
possible speakers. DiCenso, observing Freud’s primary and then Derrida’s and Ricoeur’s
secondary analyses, notes both the problem of an overdetermination of semantic meaning
as well as the overinterpretation of possible symptoms of meaning, both of which derive
from the multiplicity or pluralization of semantic meaning and the lack of a preconsensual foundation to the semantic:
…in The Interpretation of Dreams notions of overdetermination and
overinterpretation anticipate the rejection of paradigms of univocity by
contemporary theories. Overdetermination applies to formative influences in the
30

genesis of dreams, symptoms, and texts. Overinterpretation indicates the
consequent multiplicity of modes and levels of meaning that emerge in analyzing
these phenomena. Meaning is, in principle, uncontrollable and open-ended. This
open-endedness is the product both of an inherent pluralization within language
and symbols (as expressed in Paul Ricoeur’s emphasis on polysemy), and of the
proliferation of meaning in relation to contexts and viewpoints (as in Jacques
Derrida’s dissemination).
Derrida summarizes the latter thus:
“dissemination…can be led back neither to a present of simple origin nor of an
eschatological presence….It marks an irreducible and generative multiplicity.”39

The use of a term which originates from a “generative multiplicity” yet which achieves
consensus and circulation implies a semantic energetics, that is a momentum of “will to
negotiate-compromise-accept-concede” to a usable meaning from a polysemic set of
possible meanings.
To summarize the excess of linguistic consensus or contract, the “inherent
pluralization within language” refers to our assertion of the linguistic and energetic
excess of the semantic condition. As noted in our introductory etymological survey,
linguistic terms have multiple possible definitions and uses in language, the term’s
definition is itself dependent upon other terms with their own multiple possible
definitions, and most vitally as Deleuze instructs, the conjunction of terms requires and
already assumes will, differentiating potentiation, and value. Moreover, in the culture of
discourse, speakers carry to the term their own unique linguistic bias and background, the
multiplicity of which constitutes a linguistic yet overdetermined consensus. Multiple
possible definitions and uses of terms and multiple possible speakers who approach the
term with their own version of the nativity of the language mark the observable
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plurivocal nature of the linguistic excess.

Speaking, communicating in text, are

contractualized functions, but it is entirely unclear how this contract is “written.” That is,
this plurivocal condition itself implies the insinuation of an extra-linguistic will working
in the contractual process: intrinsic and extrinsic negotiation and compromise of the
definition of terms inheres in the contractual process of language and constitutes the
energetic condition of its excess, an excess economic.
Circulating: Likewise, the “circulating” condition of the semantic excess implies
both a linguistic excess and an extra-linguistic momentum. That is, once agreed upon in
contract, words become circulated, moving in repetition between speakers.

The

hypothetical contractual negotiation, whether explicitly and scholastically labored or
informally and implicitly agreed upon, tends to become more implicitly defined in the
repetition of the terms of language: in the habituated use of a term that term tends to
achieve a non- or less-than-negotiated status, that is it tends toward a “literal” or
literalized usage.
Likewise, this linguistic achievement is not attained without a non-linguistic or
extra-linguistic momentum, that is the simple repetition of the term constitutes an
energetic momentum which tends to pressure the non- or less-than-fully reflective (hence
habitual) literality of the term’s use in language. Freud’s re-discovery of the “speaking
cure” insighted that the determination and overdetermination of the possible terms of
language are never absent psychic force.

32

Summary of the Semantic Excess: The semantic or “literal” use of language
speaks from a set of possible multiplicities of definition of terms; the indefinite
referability of the definition of terms by other terms of language infers further
complication of any pure semantic meaning; all implicate the condition of undecidability
of the semantic and as such constitute a linguistic semantic excess. Moreover, the
contractual and circulated condition of semantic language terms, as willful agreement and
repetitive usage between speakers, appears to be not fully accountable without a nonlinguistic40 or extra-linguistic momentum, that is an implied psychic-energetic status of
the semantic. The semantic persists in a condition of excess, both linguistic and extralinguistic.41 We can note a native heteroglossia 42 to the semantic field.

40
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linguistic resources utilized by the transcendental philosopher in analyzing experience.” Kant’s general avoidance of
the problem of language is problematic for the full expression of his critical philosophy.
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Excess of the Semiotic Field
We call any specific formalization of expression a regime of signs, at least when the
expression is linguistic. A regime of signs constitutes a semiotic system. But it appears difficult
to analyze semiotic systems in themselves: there is always a form of content that is
simultaneously inseparable from and independent of the form of expression, and the two forms
pertain to assemblages that are not principally linguistic.43

A concept of the “semiotic field” is much more difficult for us to gain hold of for
it tends to inhere in the semantic field as both a “regime of signs” but also, by its
definition, as symptom, as Derrida’s trace – that is, if linguistic syntax courses in the
metered foot of speech, then the semiotic traces its footprint in the shifting sands and
flows or momentums of meaning registers.

A linguistic naiveté is ruptured by

indecisiveness in the core of the linguistic and extra-linguistic exchanges of meaning.
Our analysis of this complexity will proceed on two tracks. First, from a more or
less conventional angle of the contracted/circulated definition of the term semiotic
(similar to the Deleuze/Guattari first usage above, as a “regime of signs”). Next, because
we claim that the contracted/circulated definition may in fact be inadequate in tracking a
more or less complete map of this regime or register of the semiotic, we will therefore
consider a meta-analysis of the semantic and semiotic fields which addresses that which
appears “inseparable from and independent of the form of expression [which] pertain to
assemblages that are not principally linguistic.”
Our first track works from the “conventional” definition of semiotic. The OED notes
two lines of reference, while the Collins English Dictionary expands to three:
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semiotic, semeiotic adj.
1. Relating to symptoms.
2. Symbolic, serving to convey meaning.44
1. (Linguistics) relating to signs and symbols, esp. spoken or written signs
2. (Linguistics) relating to semiotics
3. (Medicine) of, relating to, or resembling the symptoms of disease;
symptomatic
[from Greek sēmeiōtikos taking note of signs, from sēmeion a sign]45

Semiotics references two broad areas of study similar to the Deleuze-Guattari
formula:
1. (Linguistics) the study of signs and symbols, esp. the relations between
written or spoken signs and their referents in the physical world or the world of
ideas.)
2. (Medicine) the scientific study of the symptoms of disease; symptomatology;
also called semiology semeiology.46

For our purposes, the first semiotic register relates to the study of linguistic meaning, that
is, the use of signs to originate, contract, and then circulate conventional systems of
communication such as: “The cat chases the mouse,” “Herd the mammoths into the blind
canyon and then we hunt them from the cliff by the large boulder…” These examples of
course involves the technical examination of codes and how they can isolate, convene,
and then convey specific meaning in communication systems. Umberto Eco renders a
specific and perhaps useful set of definitions:
Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign. A sign is
everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for something else. This
something else does not necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the
moment in which a sign stands for it.
…semiotics studies all cultural process as processes of communication.
44
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…This process is made possible by the existence of a code.
A code is a system of signification. …When – on the basis of an underlying rule
– something actually presented to the perception of the addressee stands for
something else, there is signification.
…A signification system is an autonomous semiotic construct that has an abstract
mode of existence independent of any possible communicative act it makes possible.
On the contrary (except for stimulation processes) every act of communication to or
between human beings – or any other intelligent biological or mechanical apparatus –
presupposes a signification system as its necessary condition.47

Eco appears to articulate the first set of definitions which pertain to “…the
semiotic…semiotics” as the study of signs, and specifically the study of code systems
which facilitate human communication. Eco’s principles thus follow:
a. “Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign” and
“a sign is everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for
something else…” [my emphasis] asserts that the semiotic register pertains
to the representation and/or substitution of subjective objects of reference
to code systems: for example, a “tall organic structure” within my view or
touch can be coded to its sign reference “tree.”
b. The “substitution” of the object for the sign appears to be a virtual process.
The code process holds independently in addition to or separate from the
actual object/sign structure, i.e., “…This something else does not
necessarily have to exist… A signification system is an autonomous
semiotic construct that has an abstract mode of existence independent of
any possible communicative act it makes possible.” The representation or
47
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substitution holds independently, and hypothetically can thus be used in
this virtual condition to construct a valid, usable, or accepted
representation or contra-wise to construct a “lie” or misrepresentation or
mis-substitution.
c. Eco will reference further on the necessary validation of a “correct”
“semiotic convention,” i.e., “…when this association is culturally
recognized and systematically coded…There is a sign every time a human
group decides to use and to recognize something as the vehicle of
something else.”48

This principle coincides with Deleuze-Guattari’s

reference to contracted and then circulated words as signs.
d. Eco also stipulates that “…semiotics…the semiotic” as sign or code
systems are “necessary conditions.” This principle is less empirically
obvious, and appears to open the semiotic register to the question “…what
or who…” claims this “necessary condition.”
This very brief consideration of Eco’s Theory does not claim to be complete or
comprehensive but rather merely heuristic for our purposes of clarifying the semantic and
semiotic registers. As such, we may observe that the first three principles coincide with
what we have stipulated as the semantic register, that is systems of linguistic signs with
more or less literal (contracted-consensual) and common usage (circulated/circulating)
meaning and furthermore which may be subject to true or false verification. For a
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consideration of the semiotic register their coincidence refers to “…relating to
signs…esp. spoken or written signs.”

However, what remains in excess are both

“symbols” (as distinct from signs) and “symptomatology” as the study of the “symptoms”
of meaning. We would claim that this initial isolation of a semiotic excess, as a further
elaboration of the semantic excess which must express the semiotic, is not coincidental
and that symbol and symptomatology share a common ground which relates to Eco’s
fourth principle, the “necessary condition” of the semiotic.
A symbol denotes a more complex meaning function than sign: a sign can
express a symbol but in so doing surpasses the code system in at least two ways. First, a
symbol, such as the “Tomb of Jesus” in Christianity or the Sacred Ka’ba of Islam can be
expressed as semantically signified empirical objects in an accepted or consensual
historical context – Jesus was crucified on the cross and his body entombed by witnesses,
and the Ka’ba is an accepted holy site with empirical reference. However, each can
signify “something” which exceeds any empirical reference – for the Christian believer
the tomb may signify the site where Jesus manifests as both fully mortal but with the
resurrection also fully “divine,” while the Ka’ba “holds” and resounds as the most sacred
site of Allah. As such, the symbol functions as both a sign but also as a symptom of an
extra-semantic or extra-linguistic reference, “like” Anselm’s extra-conceptual concept of
God or Shaikh Ahmad Al-‘Alawī’s reference to “God in the veil itself.” In this sense, a
symbol exceeds its semantic sense “…by virtue of the unequal parts which it subsumes
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and draws together, but draws together as unequal parts…”49 The semantic “carries” the
“sense” of the symbolic but the “sense of the symbolic” exceeds its semantic register.
Secondly, while both the semantic and the semiotic require “interpretation,” semantic
interpretation seeks what Paul Ricoeur might call a hermeneutics of suspicion (or
minimal, specifying field), while the possible semiotic register requires Ricoeur’s
hermeneutics of expansion. That is, semantic interpretation involves the clarification of
the meaning of a word or proposition which may eventuate contractual agreement (or
not) as to the “correct” or “applicable” (or not) usage or possible circulation: if I state
that “the cat chases the mouse” I am not referring to an elephant pursuing a semi-truck &
trailer; and in the command to “herd the mammoths into the blind canyon” I’m not
issuing a command to meet by the fire and drink beer. The minimal process of semantic
interpretation serves to determine the expressed intentional meaning of a statement. On
the other hand, a hermeneutics of expansion involves statements which are expressed in
the semantic register, and therefore carry contracted/circulated meaning, yet are at the
same time not immediately or comprehensively reducible to a simplified semantic
register: “God in the veil” or “that than which nothing great may be conceived” or the
“Ka’ba as the sacred site of Allah” are statements which the Christian or the Muslim
“understand” yet the statements exceed the immediate semantic register because the
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statement contain terms which are now functioning differently and in contrast to their
immediate semantic expression.50
In summary, we can observe self-critically but also empirically that our attempt to
clarify the semantic versus the semiotic is itself symptomatic of the excesses of the
semantic and semiotic conditions. Therefore, in a second analysis we will pursue the
suspicion that the excesses of the semantic and semiotic registers themselves express at
least two additional fundamental aporias or gaps which haunt thought. Let us initially
designate these as symptom and background. Symptom pertains to the second set of
definitions of “…semiotics…the semiotic” while background addresses an operative
ontological problem in the meaning condition. Each are intrinsic and yet independent of
the thought of the meaning condition, or to re-quote Deleuze and Guattari, each are
“…simultaneously inseparable from and independent of the form of expression.”
Symptomatology and symptom, we recall, are alternative and secondary
definitions of “…semiotics…the semiotic.” However, the study of symptoms, as medical
signs, complicates any “semiology” by implicating the “body” of the image in a non- or
extra-semantic and extra-semiotic observation. Symptom derives from the Greek prefix
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syn- (“together”) and ptoma (“mischance”)51 but also denotes “an indication of
disease…a casualty…that befalls one.”52 The study of semiotics is thus akin to the study
of mischance (as a ventured but somehow failed “bet,” and perhaps also as a mischance
of fortune) but as well the study of casualty, wound, or injury. The study of language
pertains to the wound or mischance of meaning or the meaning condition.

Zizek

approaches this conundrum via Lacan’s insight that “…the Real can be inscribed [peut
s’inscrire] only through a deadlock of formalization”53 which is to suggest that the act of
signification always fails the complete an exhaustive description of that which it would
inscribe – the act of inscription formalizes by limitation in the symbolic order the
comprehension of the totality of the so-called “real” order, and this formalization is by
definition an always faltering attempt.54 As such, while still able to contract and circulate
meaning, the symbolic order may also thus denote itself as a casualty of meaning: “In
other words, the Real cannot be inscribed, but we can inscribe this impossibility itself, we
can locate its place: a traumatic place which causes a series of failures55…. The symbolic
structure must include an element which embodies its ‘stain,’ its own point of
impossibility around which it is articulated: in a way it is the structuring of its own
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impossibility.”56 “That” which terms express in the meaning order is both inseparable (as
“that” specified, de-limited “object” which is described/inscribed) from the expression
itself and yet, paradoxically, it remains independent of the inscription by virtue of the
very order of expression which by definition delimits and inscribes as an only partially
and wounded inscription, and the form of expression of this paradoxical assemblage is
the form of the symptom:

“…the paradox is that this symbolic pact, this structural

network of relations, can establish itself only in so far as it is embodied in a totally
contingent material element, a little-bit-of-Real which, by its sudden irruption, disrupts
the homeostatic indifference of relations between subjects. In other words, the imaginary
balance changes into a symbolically structured network through a shock of the Real.
…Why? Because the big Other, the symbolic order, is always barré, failed, crossed-out,
mutilated, and the contingent material element embodies this internal blockage, limit, of
the symbolic structure.”57

We can note that the meaning condition appears to be

expressed using contracted and circulated signs and symbols, and now also “symptoms”
of meaning either expressed but also latent “as” or “in” meaning. We may also discern
that “that” which is expressed, while rendered in an apparently increasingly problematic
mode, can use language to reference the world in a signed and/or symbolic and/or
symptomatic order of “meaning.”
Zizek insinuates the next semiotic category of concern in the image of “…the big
Other.” That is, the meaning condition can be seen to attempt to at least minimally
56
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reference the “complete” register of meaning even if that register’s reference system is
wounded, incomplete, and only expressed symptomatically both because of the intrinsic
limits of its mode of apprehension but also because the field of complete reference is
itself never comprehensively commensurable.

Even if physics might theoretically

extrapolate a “Big Bang” at the “inception” of the “universe,” these terms themselves
radically resist definition and in fact assign Zizek’s pathology of meaning: to assign the
word “universe” as a reference to the complete, exhaustive data set of possible physical
reference is already to introduce a finite de-fined designation to the apparently indefinite
data set of possible universe(s) – yet from both the minimal empirical study even a @14
billion year old “universe” is a finite assumption (and may not in fact “be” very old at
all). From another angle, a maximal theoretical study is confounded by the non-empirical
conundrum “Why or how is there or was there ever something rather than nothing, ever,
at all…?” Such a register must reference the complete set of signified objects and their
possible (or impossible) complete expression. But it is just this effort to signify the
incommensurable which shadows thought and the hope or expectation of expressing its
background complete set, abstractly stated as Lonergan’s “…complete set of answers to
the complete set of questions.” To “complete” such a wounded, incomplete reference to
the dream of a complete meaning register, we can observe, if only abstractly, that the
semantic and semiotic foregrounds of expression are apparently always held or contrasted
in abeyance against an implied complete background. This background is active and
effective in both the semantic and the semiotic dimensions of the register. When the sign
43

or symbol “▲” for “delta” or difference is inscribed on the blackboard what we perceive
is (a) the data-set of “▲” and (b) the complete data-set of “▲” against its indefinite and
comprehensive background, that is the complete set of “▲” and “not-▲.” The shift from
(a) to (b) abstractly inscribes the wound of the symptom because the form of expression
of the equation has already scarred and mutilated the possibility of the complete and true
image: the image itself is already, in its inscription, a “new” foreground with its own
“new” background. Pure difference “▲” is inscribed inseparably but only in an already
“next” repetition which thus renders its sign as symptom in repetition and its “essence”
independent of this symptomatic image. Winquist describes Lonergan’s equation as
revealing the necessary condition of the “prescision of knowing”:
Lonergan’s notion of being as the complete set of answers to the complete set of
questions is an unrestricted notion which cannot be realized under any set of
conditioned heuristic structures belonging to our transcendental imagination.58
What this means is that if we decide to work toward an understanding of the being
which manifests itself as the content of the known, then we have prescinded from the
question of the nature of reality itself. The notion of being which is available to
ordinary discourse is a notion of proportionate being. The proportion is determined
by a structural isomorphism with the formal heuristic character of the transcendental
imagination since these structures provide the formal principles for the unity of any
given concrete situation.59

Deleuze will express this insight as such: “We cannot think of the condition in the image
of the conditioned…”60 However, we must ask if this insight is functionally occluded in
the contracting and then circulating function of terms in their forms of expressions: the
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condition of the semiotic is always conditioned and this condition presupposes,
“prescinds” from the assumption of meaning as such. Or to extrapolate from Winquist’s
description of Lonergan’s abstract image, to imagine the possibility of “the full set of
answers” is already to condition “an unrestricted” into “a conditioned heuristic structure,”
that is, a restricted structure – this constitutes a penultimate but nonetheless asserted
naming of an unnamable concept, as in Anselm’s “…that than which nothing greater can
be conceived…”
More critically, however, we note the semantic and semiotic psychology which
surreptitiously emerges from this penult: Winquist’s observation that “The proportion
(the conditioned) is determined by a structural isomorphism with…formal heuristic
character…” (my parenthetical insert) marks the subtle but intractable Rubicon where
the apparently incommensurable statement assumes heuristic meaning and thought may
take flight (and power) and even an undeserved dominion over “…the Big Real…the Big
other…, etc.” This is not an ontological observation but rather an empirical observation
of the internal “logic” and/or “a-logic” of sense and speech which nonetheless expresses
an assumed ontology in the structure of knowing.

Derrida appears to express this

problem of knowing from within the code system itself, that is as intrinsic to the
“structure” of expression itself: “This supplement of a code which traverses its own
field, endlessly displaces its closure, breaks its line, opens its circle, and no ontology will
have been able to reduce it.”61
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The perpetual displacement of the code and its supplement notwithstanding, the
momentum of expression appears to desire its full address or accounting of the potential
meaning condition as observed in the energetic assertion of such statements themselves,
as we find in both Lonergan’s or Anselm’s formulas. Winquist observes Lonergan
further: “Lonergan notes that our notion of being, which is itself a heuristic notion, must
have its foundation in the dynamic orientation of the pure desire to know.”62 We observe
both an indefinite “desire to know” but this desire perpetually encounters, and encounters
by definition of this penultimate status rather than simply its direct failure, the indefinite
semiotic register itself, “…the full set…” or “…that than which…” These perpetually
penultimate references to the extreme excess of the register are functionally intrinsic to
the register itself: its native status cannot avoid its equation which by definition already
is formulated as “▲” and “all that is not ▲.” The semiotic penult indefinitely expresses
(semantically) its definite (conditioned, proportioned, contracted, circulated) formulation
of the indefinite register of signification. Moreover, Lonergan’s stipulation of the “desire
to know” itself expresses the indefinite register, or rather, the internal energetic
momentum which must be or desire to be commensurate to the possible indefinite
register. Signification thus can be expressed as the register upon which the indefinite
desire to know definitely encounters and natively signifies the field of possible reference
of “▲” and “all that is not ▲.”
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Such analysis constitutes a semiotic anamnesis because we are forced to exfoliate
the internal formula of signification itself. Semiotic analysis is an internal “recall to
memory” of the operative components and hypothetical structure of not only how
signification expresses but must also account for the full “equationability” of the possible
field of reference. The occlusion of the full potential of both the energy and the field by
its expression is a native fact of signification which prescinds from the sign. We cannot
purge this limiting fact from the equation because it constitutes the equation.
Summary of the Excess of the Semiotic Field:

The excess of the semiotic

condition prescinds from any formulation of the condition itself but is nonetheless
natively stipulated in the (energetic) desire to express this internal excess both
conditionally and unconditionally in semantic registers. Expressions of “religion: or “the
religious” appear to at once affirm and defy Deleuze’s observation that “We cannot think
of the condition in the image of the conditioned…”63 because they claim to be expressing
concerns of unconditional meaning yet within the semantic register. We are suggesting
that this claim is legitimated by the very assemblage of the composite semantic and
semiotic conditions, that is “ ‘▲’ and all that is not ‘▲’ .”
Freud appears to address this issue indirectly as a precept to dream interpretation
in the principle of secondary revisioning.

That is, the dream-image functionally

prescinds from (and hence resists) any attempt to analyze or interpret its significance
which, however, does not prevent such secondary analysis – on the contrary, the
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fascination with an unconditional (more and less) dream-image captivates thought in a
psychological momentum which is precipitated in an irresistible desire for its thought.
As the secondary “thought” of the dream itself emerges and transverses into “heuristic
structures” it transforms the dream-image indelibly to a signified meaning, the by-product
of which is the functional (unavoidable) forgetfulness of the pure force of the dreamimage itself: force is surreptitiously transversed to meaning. Deleuze thus thrusts the
apparent intolerability of the abstract thought-image into a concept of compossibility in
which a recognition of the full field of thought is accepted to theory as ‘▲’ folded into
“… and all that is not ‘▲’ ”:
“…the very condition of “compossibility,” in a manner of reconstituting over and
again one and the same, infinitely infinite, converging series, the World, made of
all series, its curvature having a unique variable. The differential relation thus
acquires a new meaning, since it expresses the analytical extension of one series
into another, and no more the unity of converging series that would not diverge
in the least from each other. Now then, infinity also changes meaning. It
acquires a fourth and still current dimension: it is no longer defined either by
itself or by the “limit” of a series, but by a law of order or continuity that
classifies limits or transforms series into a “totality” (the presently infinite
totality of the world, or the transfinite).”64

What remains is to impute the consideration of the energetic, that is the semiotic
and now psychic energy of this compossibility as it transverses meaning and emerges
onto the cultural field.
Initial Observations
Observation and analysis of the semantic and semiotic registers (the “meaning”
register) must be, or rather, already are situated as the operational starting point of any
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theory of “…religion…religions…the religious” because the configuration of the
semantic and semiotic registers prescind from their expression in signs and symptoms.
First, more careful consideration of how “signs” and “symptoms” express appears to
insinuate an indefinite or polysemic multiplicity to expression; second, more careful
consideration of “expression” appears to insinuate an energetics of indefinite momentum
or measure to the equation; and finally, any boundary “between” the semantic and
semiotic conditions appears to stipulate a “boundary condition” itself of both liminal
expressibility and efficient yet non-quantifiable energy. In each of the semantic and
semiotic conditions we observe conditional statements expressed from a register which
appears to be both conditional and unconditional. The composite condition appears able
to express both conditional, contracted and circulated terms, yet also to be able to express
unconditional portmanteau terms. This conditionalized and extra-conditionalized nativity
of the registers of meaning appear to render sign and symptom as compositions of an
anterior figuration which challenges normative Western philosophical discourse and
particularly any definable epistemological structuration of knowing or expression. As
Derrida poignantly suggests:
We must let ourselves be referred to an order that no longer refers to sensibility.
But we are not referred to intelligibility either, to an ideality not fortuitously
associated with the objectivity of theorein or understanding. We must be
referred to an order, then, that resists philosophy’s founding opposition between
the sensible and the intelligible.”65
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However, we challenge Derrida’s own structuration of thought in his use of the concept
of the “infrastructure,” expressed by Gasché that: “…The infrastructure, consequently,
must be thought of as preceding, in a nontemporal way, the alternative of being and
nothingness, of presence and absence, and of the ontico-ontological difference as well, as
Derrida shows in ‘Difference.’ If an infrastructure is to assume the explicatory status of a
ground, it must be a radical alterity in excess of that which it accounts for. …the
infrastructure acquires its interpretive efficiency with regard to the specific problems it
clarifies through being in excess of the opposition of sense and non-sense, meaning and
the absence of meaning. …it is in a position of anteriority to the epoch of meaning and
the loss of meaning.”66 On the contrary, we diverge from Derrida in that we will assert
that no claim can be made that the infrastructure prescinds from a “ground” or an
“alterity” to thought. Rather, we claim that we can only observe thought as an infrasymptom of its own “structure-as-symptom” which we have abstracted to the equation
“‘▲’ and all that is not ‘▲’”; nor do we require such a “ground” to observe that thought
is a symptom of this equation. On the other hand, what we can claim is that discursive
thought which derives from this equation “ ‘▲’ and all that is not ‘▲’ ” bears an
energetic which exceeds thought not as structural alterity but rather as the infra-economic
of meaning. The semantic and semiotic registers of meaning should always appear
inefficient in its semantic expression because its energetic flow should always exceed
such expression, but this difference makes all the difference as we examine the excessive
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expressions of culture and particularly religious culture. Whether the study of culture,
and in particular religious studies, is fully cognizant of this difference at this stage of its
unfolding remains in question. As such, what is termed “alterity” is rather a perpetual
alternativity of the register of meaning.

51

Etymological Concern: Contracted and Circulated Terms
Analysis thereby encounters its meta-analysis in the first, second and third terms
of “religio,” that is as the third term “…bounded by or to…” invades the terms “rite” and
“ritual” and appears then to levy a complex force upon the etymological figuration of our
hypothetical equation: any linguistic analysis occurs in the context of language and
hence must be, self-critically, a meta-method.67

On the one hand, we can connect

“bounded” to “text” and “rite”: the religious participant is “bound to…or by…” a “text”
or a “rite” in careful and ritualized practice. Yet on the other hand, the equation is
incomplete without a reference to “what” the text or rite is bound.
Nonetheless, in their etymological survey, as we referenced earlier, both Smith
and Raschke are noting the originating problematic of our study in the initial definition of
the named field of study itself. And, from our introductory summary, we noted what we
termed the “counter-valenced” or “heterogeneous” levels of the inquiry’s own terms in
the formula.
We also noted that, absent a more complete accounting of the semantic and
semiotic meaning registers, we are challenged to discover Deleuze’s disjunctive condition
in the term “religion…religious…” as rooted in ligare. From Deleuze’s angle, it would

67

Meta here is used to point to the internal complexity of the problem of language whenever an attempt occurs to
critique language. For example, Surber, in Metacritique, observes of the metakrikker that “…we can say that
Metakritik begins by asserting a “linguistic a priori” as more fundamental than and the ultimate condition for any
subsequent assertion of a “conceptual” or “categorical a priori” of the sort advocated by Kantian
transcendentalism.”(Jere Surber, Metacritique, 13) The trajectory of our thesis is rather to assert that the metaconditionality of the problem of language is a function of the internal semantic and semiotic condition which, following
Deleuze’s critique, does not posit a new a priori but rather works from the empirical observation of the multiple and
complex situation intrinsic to language’s “states of affairs” but more precisely to the states of affairs which arise when
the terms of language critique and analyze their own condition.

52

appear that our analysis is still hunting within the contracting or circulating conditions of
the term: “religion,” as a contracting word, may appear to “perform a synthesis of
succession over a single series” in that “rite” and “text” can “bind” the religious
participant to a set of careful practices and as such “…extract from them their composite
sense (“connection”); in a similar vein, “religion” as a circulating word can “…perform a
synthesis of coexistence and coordination between two heterogeneous series…” and as
such function to form a “conjunction” of terms. As a “contracted” term, “religion” can
be assigned a heuristic value which sites it in relation to the valences of the semantic
arrangement. Here too, as a “circulated” term, “religion” can be assigned a heuristic
value which by definition allows it to perform a synthetic function of coordination
between heterogeneous series – in both cases, the complexity appears to be contained
“semantically” in pre-given arrangements and pre-determined circulated structures of
signification.
The contracted and circulated characteristics of language usage notwithstanding,
there appears to be another, or rather, an alter-native character to these same
contracted/circulated terms which exceed the register. This excess is not merely an
etymological complex which may or may not achieve contract or circulation (usable
validity) but rather this excess appears to “stem” internally from terms and propositions
such as “…that than which…” or “…seeing in the veil itself…” or “…the full set of
answers…” or even “…why is there something…” using contractible and circulatable
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terminologies. Or less abstractly, within our equation of religio, how can (if it can) our
discipline contract and circulate the third term religio or ligare in an academic register?
Can we anticipate that Deleuze’s “contracted” and “circulating” fields pertain to
the discourse which has tended to evolve into the “academic” study of religion or
“religious studies” in recent decades since the American academy’s early formulation (if
it was ever formally formulated) of its “vision” or version of the discipline in the 1960’s1970’s?

Further inquiry should question whether these fields of discourse have

dominated at the expense of the “disjunctive” or “portmanteau” voices of the “religious”
or, what Raschke will, in less or more measured rebellion, stipulate as the “dialogical
turn.”68 This turn, as we are observing in our examination, cannot be stipulated in the
first two terms of the formula – our examination’s thesis asserts therefore that “it”
exceeds as the “third term” by contracted/circulated definition from within as an internal
alter-native of the register itself. Etymological confusion or complexity of the contracted
or circulated use of language cannot account for its own repetitive internal excess but this
ironically and paradoxically does not allow our extrication from the contracted and
circulated contextability of thinking by projecting semi-contracted or semi-circulated
“externalized alterities” – the problem of language is rather domiciled in the alter-native
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turn within language itself and everything we can hope to have or use as reference hides
or evanesces in the veil itself. Nietzsche’s or Western culture’s eternal return speaks
rather as an internal turning.
Smith pressures this point from within the discourse itself in a manner which is
helpful for our critique. He observes that American religious studies scholars have
resisted a self-awareness and a cognizance the “religion(s)…the religious” and he notes:
“Religion” is not a native category…it is a category imposed from the outside on
some aspect of the native culture…”
“…there is an implicit universality. “Religion” is thought to be a ubiquitous
human phenomenon.”
“In constructing the second-order, generic category “religion,” its characteristics
are those that appear natural to the other. In these quotations this familiarity is
signaled by the phrases “knowledge of god” and “religion…as we understand it.”
“Religion” is an anthropological not a theological category.”69

Indeed, in an earlier work, Imagining Religion, Smith further asserts that
“Religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study. It is created for the scholar’s
analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization. Religion has
no independent existence apart from the academy.

For this reason, the student of

religion, and most particularly the historian of religion, must be relentlessly selfconscious. Indeed, this self-consciousness constitutes his primary expertise, his foremost
object of study.”70
Smith is thus addressing the crux of the problematic: “religious” studies has first
contracted and then circulated a discipline which both explicitly and implicitly imposes
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these first conditions of discourse, the contracted and the circulated, to frame (if not
circumvent) the third term, the disjunctive, which, ironically, remains the surreptitious
background condition of the “religion…the religious…” This strategy would appear to
be an academic strategy on its surface aided, perhaps not fully intentionally, by a
semantic and semiotic strategy in its depth.

Can we suggest that the study of

“religion…the religious…” has tended to marginalize its own unique capacity to express
a disjunctive third term of its register?
Religious studies remains a viable discipline as such, that is, to continue with
Smith’s approach, an academic discipline. Our discovery simply reminds the academy
that such a discipline engenders its own incompletion without the third term. In Smith’s
own observation: "I have come to believe that a prime object for the historian of religion
ought to be the theological tradition, taking the term in the widest sense."71
Non-Etymological Concern: The energetic disjunctive background
The internal remainder, Deleuze’s portmanteau term, addresses the symptomatic
condition of meaning veiled within and upon the semantic surface condition of discourse:
meaning is only expressed in discourse.
The register of “…religion(s)…the religious…” may be both a contentious
objective of empirical research and explication, and therefore a discussion possible within
Kant’s categories or his self-limiting paradigm of reason, yet ironically and paradoxically
this empirical method is not complete without referability to that which is the exception
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to reason, the portmanteau expression, “…bound…bounded…boundedness…”, that is, to
empirical inclusion in the discipline’s progression to statements of indefinite reference
such as Anselm’s “…that than which nothing greater can be conceived…” We will
stipulate, however, that this internal exception is not merely the status of an extracurricular theology or an attempted but limited discipline of internally externalized socalled “alterity,” but is rather the insinuated condition of reason itself, reason “fully”
(“full” as indefinitely iterated and extended) accounted, reason whose momentum desires
a full accountability of itself. Therefore, the Kantian grenzbegriff cannot be a “borderline
concept” external to the reach of reason, but is rather the internalizing exception to
reason itself, it is the alter-native condition of the equation of reason upon which the
empirical study of religion in particular, and reason in general, is predicated.72 This turn
points to the internal return and completion of the Kantian project to its alter-native
expression: it will insinuate faith or desire as requisite for reason rather than merely
Kant’s own alter-native, i.e., reason critiqued in order to “make room for faith.” The
modern/post-modern shift is revisionable as an internal turn of the semantic and semiotic
registers.
Religious studies remains incomplete and unviable without the third term which
speaks as its ghost “background,” its veiled boundedness. If discourse constitutes a
72
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primary via regias of the discipline, then the semantic and semiotic registers are
empirically (as the semantic evidence reveals) and emphatically (as the psychic force of
expression evidences) a theological discipline whether it self-critically achieves this
recognition or not: “…Called or not called God will be there… .” However, in calling
and naming “religion…the religious…” have we not already addressed this internal
conundrum, but more obviously have we not already been addressed? It is a curious
footnote that the emerging discipline of what might be termed “philosophical
psychology” in the works of James Hillman and others stipulates a psychological maxim
to philosophical discourse in the term “…stick to the image…”73 whether analysis focuses
on the image of the dream or, in this case, the complete image of thought. As such, the
examination

remains

only

provisional,

i.e.,

“pivoting”

or

turning

at

this

juncture/disjuncture, and we therefore require additional conceptual strategies with which
to discuss the register of “…religion…religions…the religious…”
Finally, our treatment of the semantic register as distinct from the semiotic
register has, we believe, discovered an internalizing complexity and disjunction. These
terms, while useful in themselves in the contractual and circulating senses, cannot
however be mapped to separate topographies but rather find themselves domiciled in an
internal, overlapping complexity in the homeland of the meaning condition itself. The
attempt to clearly and lucidly distinguish them appears to be a symptom of the categorical
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imperative itself which, again, while useful, remains a sub-set of the full equation of
reason on the one hand and yet a not merely potentially dangerous instigator of
intellectual hegemony on the other. Such hegemony, ironically, reveals discourse as
symptomatic and the momentum of the semantic and semiotic registers as energetic or, to
recall Nietzsche’s expression, as the will to power. The terms semantic and semiotic
refer to and cross-reference the register of meaning as a complexity.
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IV.

Conceptual Strategies
“The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of an object, and consists in limitation,
whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it
immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes a representation of unlimitedness,
yet with a super-added thought of its totality.”74

Our discipline demands a revisioned and unique conceptual complexity in the arts
and sciences because both this domain and our ability to account for the capacity of our
study remain incomplete and penultimate without strategies which approximate the
empirical topography of our observable data-sets. Just as the disjunctive portmanteau
statement is expressed in contracted, circulated terms and hence achieves an internal
empirical reference in discourse, the “…bounded to…by…” stakes claim to its empirical
position in the complexity of what we think we can mean by “…religion…religions…the
religious…” as an academic pursuit.
The “Prescision” from Sense and Difference
We suspect an arrangement to the thought of sense which already “prescinds”
from both thought and what we have nominated as “sense.” Indeed, we might speculate
that sense itself appears to be a function of precision itself. That is, the verb transitive
“prescind” refers to the act “to separate or divide in thought; consider individually,” and
the verb intransitive “to withdraw one's attention.”75 Sense is always “sense of…” “this”
or “that” or “this in contrast to this other this or that…”, and so on.
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Before its nomination in the term “sense,” sense is already itself prescinding
“from,” that is it is transitively “separating, dividing…” the surface of the field in the
subject of sense to the object of sense. “Subject” and “object” are already linguistic
“terms” used to nominate the sub-sets of sense. Or intransitively, this passive sense can
also be seen to “draw” focus to the object as it “withdraws” attention to all that is not the
object, or the implied complete background of the object. It appears we must assume that
prescision is not an operation of thought before it is an operation of sense, even if
nominated as an operation of sense by a term of thought. Sense both pre-forms and also
per-forms its operation as the differentiating function of the encounter of a nominated
“subject” with the nominated “object.”

Prescision thus stipulates at least two

characteristics for our theory: first, what we term “sense” is already pre- or “ante”-posed
in advance by sense prescinding from the “world”; secondly, this ante-position imputes a
momentum to the flow and folding of sense.

In the first instance, Deleuze will

characterize this quality as the “paradox of regress, or indefinite proliferation”:
When I designate something, I always suppose that the sense is understood, that
it is already there. As Bergson said, one does not proceed from sounds to images
and from images to sense; rather one is established “from the outset” within
sense. Sense is like the sphere in which I am already established in order to enact
possible denotations, and even to think their conditions. Sense is always
presupposed as soon as I begin to speak; I would not be able to begin without this
presupposition. In other words, I never state the sense of what I am saying. But
on the other hand, I can always take the sense of what I say as the object of
another proposition whose sense, in turn, I cannot state. I thus enter into the
infinite regress of that which is presupposed. ...This infinite proliferation of
verbal entities is known as Frege’s paradox.76
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The second precept is hinted at here as well when the “order” of sense’s
procession “…from sounds to images…” suggests the flow or momentum of sense. The
American semiotician Charles Peirce appears to be very precise about this “momentum,”
(which we also claim suggests an energetics of sense) when he refers to the “separation”
or “division” of sense in the condition of its prescision:
§5. The terms “precision” and “abstraction,” which were formerly applied to
every kind of separation, are now limited, not merely to mental separation, but to
that which arises from attention to one element and neglect of the other.
Exclusive attention consists in a definite conception or supposition of one part of
an object, without any supposition of the other. Abstraction or precision ought to
be carefully distinguished from two other modes of mental separation, which
may be termed discrimination and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely
with the essences of terms, and only draws a distinction in meaning.
Dissociation is that separation which, in the absence of a constant association, is
permitted by the law of association of images.
…Prescision is not a reciprocal process.77

Thus we impute this precept of prescision from the regress of the symptoms of a
sense of thought which has already begun.

As Peirce theorizes, the order is not

reciprocal because we can never achieve pure sense but only an after-sense. Yet it
appears that we can discern that its after-sense symptomatic expression is ironically
reciprocating in that we achieve this “sense” of the precision of sensed thought from the
ante-position of textual references to describe these symptoms. And the precept of
prescision appears to subtly suggest the “flow” of energy “from” and “to,” and though we
cannot obtain a semantic or semiotic measure of such energy we note that it must register
a certain efficiency of exchange, and this energetic must also be included in the total
equation which we will call the “sense-to-sign” register.
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Sense to Sign: The Requisite for a Theory of Semantic and Semiotic Economic
Exchange
All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the
philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination
of the order of rank among values.78
We are never referred to the real forces that form thought, thought itself is never related
to the real forces that it presupposes as thought. Truth is never related to what it presupposes.
But there is no truth that, before being a truth, is not the bringing into effect of a sense or the
realization of a value. Truth, as a concept, is entirely undetermined.79
...From denotation to manifestation, then to signification, but also from signification to
manifestation and to denotation, we are carried along a circle, which is the circle of the
proposition. Whether we ought to be content with these three dimensions of the proposition,
or whether we should add a fourth – which would be sense – is an economic or strategic
question.80

Culture rests precariously in the liminal boundary of the energetic momentum
between these semantic and the semiotic registers. This borderland renders the register as
desiring intelligibility but only more or less stable. Meaning has already occurred to
itself as it would seek to analyze, and it is already carried on the momentum of the desire
to know. From this reverse angle, Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason may be read as
much as a warning as analysis – it speaks like the gorgons at the gates of castle. We can
discern desire, faith, and pathos as primary requisites for reason.
Of course the gate is now a prescinded aporia – an impassable yet implied portal –
which closes as its opens and opens as it closes in the dynamic plays and leaps from
“desire’s” “sensibility” to its elusive and elliptical signatures in the signs of proposed
“intelligibilities.” What ante do we hold and then put up as we stand at the portal?
78
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This portal of the meaning register can also be assigned as “gap” or “gaping” –
i.e., the subtle and immeasurable implied extent “between” sensibility (the imagined “preverbal” or, in our terms, ante-verbal) and intelligibility. Each term is already achieved
through the assignment of signification – the inscription of the sign to de-sign-ate the
references of experience in a signed “time” and a “space.” That is, by assigning the
time/space mark of the sense-to-object event to a “sign,” so-assigned “intelligible
thought” “captures” the event in the signature of a language system:
Signs represent the present in its absence; they take the place of the present.
When we cannot take hold of or show the thing, let us say the present, the beingpresent, when the present does not present itself, then we signify, we go through
the detour of signs. We take up or give signs; we make signs.81

Derrida, deconstructing classical semiology from within, thus asserted that
because the sign is a “secondary” or “provisional” substitution of the time/space
“presence” or now deferred presence of the sense-to-object event, the sign could no
longer be assumed to merely represent this presence or deferred presence.82

More

critically, for a semantic and semiotic economic theory, he asserted that the “simple
symmetrical” relationship of sign to presence was in question,83 thus raising the ante for
any expectation that we could measure or estimate the energetic or economic force of an
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originary sensibility to its signature in the sign. Derrida assigned this immeasurable and
unnamable gap or aporia “différance”:
Derrida sought to radicalize the Heideggerian project by tracing the
metaphysical privileging of presence back to the tradition’s most basic
assumptions regarding language, signification, and textuality.
…Derrida
introduced the signifier différance. Identical in sound with the French
difference, of which it at first appears in misspelling, it indicates the underlying
process of opening or spacing that makes any concrete system of differences
possible. Neither active nor passive, substantial nor insubstantial, determinate
nor indeterminate, difference is…a sort of intersection of temporality becoming
spatialized. Différance is neither signs nor the differences between them but a
sort of open field of play out of which both arise. It is covered over or
suppressed by every concrete act of signification, but it is also their ultimate
source and precondition, a spacing…but not a space, a temporalizing but not any
particular temporal event, a continually receding or deferred trace of past and
future significations in the present.84

We suspect a “gap within the gap” in Surber’s observation that “Difference is neither
signs nor the differences between them but a sort of open field of play of which both
arise.” This open field is indeed, we assert, the energetic economic field which is
“covered over or suppressed” by the process itself – it constitutes what we stipulate as the
leap of faith or desire between sensibility and intelligibility. It suggests the ante of the
bet, the energy of sense which is anteed on the betting table and then rendered and
exchanged in the play of signification.
Sense to Sign “Instantiation” as the Ante of Thought
It is rather a question of a throw of the dice, of the whole sky as open space and of
throwing as the only rule. The singular points are on the die; the questions are the dice
themselves; the imperative is to throw. Ideas are the problematic combinations which
result from throws.85
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We require an additional, indeed, an excessive propaedeutic to the meaning
equation of sensibility and intelligibility itself, and we term this a propaedeutic of the
“ante.”
Hegel appears to stipulate the mechanics of the semantic register as follows:
“In Intuition we have single objects before us. Thinking brings them into relation
with each other or compares them. In Comparison it singles out what they have in
common with each other and omits that by which they differ and thus it retains only
universal ideas.”86

So here we may empirically observe thought’s own sly ante to the betting table: Hegel
assumes, or must “ante,” the semantic register (“intuition…thinking…relation…
comparison…universal ideas”) in order to describe or account for the process of thought.
But at Hegel’s juncture thought has already leapt (or lapsed), it is already in flight, but
from what space or time, what throw, what bet?
To account for the meaning register, we must therefore ante-pose this leap “from”
“sense” “to” “sign” – from Hegel’s “single objects” “to” “thinking…intuition…etc.” - we
punctuate using quotation-marks to intentionally point to each term in the order of the
ante. That is, each sign of the ante-signature of the equation is already a bet, a “put”87 of
any “thesis” which would assume and insinuate itself into the meaning register. The ante
constitutes both the sign reference and the energetic momentum which must be “put” or
“placed” in order to begin and pre-sume the play of meaning. To “presume” is to “take
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possession of without any right”88 and indeed, we and/or thought possess no “right” to its
presumption – it must simply ante the right or privilege. No “right,” that is, other than
the post facto consensus and contract of a now post-assigned semantic and semiotic
figuration and energetic.

Moreover, Hegel’s “thinking” already possesses an ante-

positing of itself in order to posit itself as such – and, we might also observe, both
“thought” and the “subject that would think” are furthermore possessed by this put – the
anteed put already stipulates both the order and the economics (the “cost” of the bet) of
the play of meaning. The light of consensual meaning is always an afterglow of a
previous positing that has already been purchased by the economics of the bet.
This ante applies to the “thought of difference.” For example, if I draw “▲” on
the blackboard the faculty of vision may see and then visually distinguish the image “▲”
as “differentiated” against the background of the blackboard (or it may not) but what-iscalled “thought” rescinds the term “difference” until I verbally insinuate the question,
“What do you see?” The “what” and the “see” have already leapt from the pure event of
seeing but this leap itself constitutes an event, the event of the energetic shift from sight
to sound to term – the event of sight is termed in the terms of the question, and as such
term-inates the pure vision as it is now sounded and inscribed in “its” verbal signing but
the “it” is itself no longer the pure vision but rather a “new” event, a new instance of
figuration. The economics of this shift must be at least efficient, that is, the event cannot
destroy the energy of the original sensory input but rather must shift and conserve it to a
new state or status: the state or status of the term is itself energetic, sensory, even
88
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sensual. Or, more likely, the event achieves an expanded economics as the mere visual
sensory input of “▲” expands into a vastly “new” sensory topography, that of the
indefinite field of the full language-set.89 It is “one thing” to “see” the “▲” as a pure
visual reference/difference, but it is quite another “thing” to write the text Difference &
Repetition.
However, the “shift” from “sense” to “sign” stipulates a qualitative as well as an
energetic or quantitative change, and this difference constitutes an immeasurable part of
the difference of the sense-to-sign ex-change, a difference which escapes “quantification”
because it metamorphoses the arch of the event-shift to a new qualitative state. Deleuze
notes in his description of Leibniz’s “fold”:
The simplest way of stating the point is by saying that to unfold is to increase, to
grow; whereas to fold is to diminish, to reduce, “to withdraw into the recesses of
a world.” [Leibniz, Letter to Arnauld, April 1687 (Gph, II, 99) [Mason, 125]]
…That is why metamorphosis or “metaschematism” pertains to more than mere
change of dimension: every animal is double – but as a heterogeneous or
heteromorphic creature, just as the butterfly is folded into the caterpillar that will
soon unfold.90

We are employing Deleuze’s illustration of the Leibnizian “fold” to suggest that the
instantiating shift from sense to sign, the intrinsic generative “unit” of the semantic and
semiotic registers, constitutes both a (1) quantitative and “economic” “-crease” (both
potentiated as in-crease but also as de-crease of energy) as sense shifts or “unfolds” to
sign, and (2) that this quantitative shift further implies (and may hide) a qualitative shift,
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a metamorphosis, which “generates” the sign as a “meta-schema” of sense in a process
which Deleuze stipulates elsewhere as the “passive genesis.”91 This liminal boundary of
the semantic and semiotic registers cannot be fully accounted but rather subsists as an
energetic and metaschematic symptom of any language event.
We stipulate this anteed move prior to the assignation of the meaning structure the
instantiation of the shift from “sense” “to” “sign” – and the “here,” in this space and
time, our “sense” and “sign” are of course themselves already anteed bets of the meaning
play. Kant’s a priori principles of space and time hold as both the “instance” or time
reference as well as the “stance” or “standing-in” or space reference of the anteed event
of meaning. But “now” the instance of the sign constitutes the event of the instance of
signification rather than pure space or time – the “play” from sense to sign instantiates its
own singular event. Instantiation is thus the insinuation of “sense” now stipulated as its
“sign” “of” “meaning” – “meaning” as a “sign” “of” “a” “sense” but now captured in the
parenthetical (etymologically, parenthesis as the “put” of the “thesis”92) complexity of
the register. Instantiation constitutes the flashpoint which precedes any semantic or
semiotic originating event, a flashpoint which, however, has by definition already lapsed
from the signature – like a flashbulb in a dark ante-room which has already flashed to
reveal the signature of the room’s image – the glow of the image is already an after-glow.
And while we might desire to dream Plato’s dream in the cave – the dream of the “Idea”
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expressed in the ‘idea” – the entire Platonic image of the “Idea/idea” remains itself
already an ante-posed instantiation.
This insight is consistent with our earlier observation that “theory” must first
acknowledge that it begins with a self-declared approach, that it carries to the scene of the
examination an intrinsic point of view, an already held system of values. The approach
and value system are expressed in their discourse and are thereby available to our
observation, critique, and analysis – the so-called semantic or deconstructive critique.
Yet our examination is forcing the discursive analysis beyond this semantic economic
register to include the implication of its own ante-positioned economic register which we
think prescinds from the formal structure.
For example, we can speculate that the method resident to phenomenology, socalled “bracketing,” may itself be “read” as the attempt to gain access to this anteposition of thought by attempting to use the “[…]” as a descriptive means of isolating the
mind’s acquisition of the object. Indeed, as with any philosophical approach, we can
trace an elaborate method yet such methods are suspended in the discursive register
already anteed and then expressed by means of this register. In fact, we might apply the
test of veracity to a philosophy or philosophical method by carefully examining its ability
to accurately adhere to its original definition of itself – does it coherently describe and
thus account for experience within the given register of its elected discourse? Does its
bet work? However, our conceptualization of the ante-regimes (the semantic +/- the
semiotic) anticipates (in arrears) the failed attempt by phenomenology to bracket and
70

thereby isolate thought or elements of thought.

That is, because the semantic and

semiotic ante-conditions of meaning are themselves only secondarily legible as a
parenthetical structure, phenomenological bracketing is better situated as only
symptomatically reflecting (rather than axiomatically accessing) the already constellated
event horizon of meaning.
A philosophical economic could thus be imagined as the energetic efficiency of
the method’s expression and application of its ante-position – this would imply its
semantic economic efficient, expressed below in point #1. Yet in point #2 we will up the
ante to include a semiotic economic:
1. The ante of discourse: The discourse is always the expression of its
semantic economic – the “ante” as its expression in language, “a”
language, that is its intrinsic boundedness in a discursive system as, for
example, critiqued by Derrida’s deconstructive analysis; the language
event, on the discursive register, is read as the instantiation of the sign in
the “space” and “time” of the text; this instantiation constitutes, moreover,
an economic investment, an ante of energy; we will explore both aspects
of the equation but here indicate that “investment” will bear on the “sense”
side of the equation – what Freud stipulated as “cathectic energy,” while
“instantiation” will bear on the sign-side of the equation. A complete
critique of the semantic register will reveal, however, that its economy
cannot be fully accounted nor completed unless we allow for an energetic
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momentum to the register: this situation we will describe as the eccentric
restrained loop of the semantic.
2. The ante of semiosis:

The full accounting of the event horizon of

meaning, what we might term the full register of the field of sensibility
(can we “call” it “desire,” or “faith,” etc. …), cannot not implicate the
entire sensual horizon of possible thought of which the discursive ante is
merely an expression, minimally a sign, and maximally the sign and its
energetic symptom; this register is subject to a radically differentiated
semiotic economics which cannot not bear upon the discursive register nor
itself be expressed except through the discursive register – what we will
describe as the eccentric un-restrained loop of the semiotic.

The Eccentric, Negotiated, Restrained, Valued “Semantic” Loop
Semiotics is dealing with sign-function, but a sign-function represents the correlation of
two functives which (outside that correlation) are not by nature semiotic.
What remains undisputed is that pour cause a code is continuously confused with the scodes: whether the code has determined the format of the s-codes or vice versa, a code
exists because s-codes exist, and the s-codes exist because a code exists, has existed or
has to exist. Signification encompasses the whole of cultural life, even at the lower
threshold of semiotics.
A theory of codes should rather be concerned to state to what degree the super-elevation
of connotation can be made possible; how much its overlapping of sense may produce a
maze-like network of intertwined sign-functions; and either this maze-like situation can
constitute the object of a semiotic structural description, or it produces a sort of
topological knot that a theory of codes can define but cannot structurally reproduce by
means of a finite model.
“Semiosis explains itself by itself; this continual circularity is the normal condition of
signification and even allows communication to use signs in order to mention things.”
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The real problem is that every semantic unit used in order to analyze a sememe is in its
turn a sememe to be analyzed. 93

In these remarkable statements from A Theory of Semiotics, Umberto Eco appears
to acknowledge the limits of a semantic and semiotic theory absent “sense,” though he
appears to be more modestly weighting its import; rather, we would assert that the entire
chain of signification begins (and “ends” to begin next) with “sense” / “sign-sense” /
“sense signed” / etc., in what can only be characterized as itself a sign-sensed “eccentric”
loop. In our proposed configuration, the conceptualization of the composite semantic and
semiotic register figures as Eco’s concept of semiotics “or” semiosis because we are
claiming, as an extension or amendment of his formulas, that the semantic and semiotic
remain inseparably and eccentrically co-implicated in discourse and that a hidden but
fierce energetic carries their composite momentum.94 Nonetheless, what figures in these
statements remain Eco’s sharply focused and recurring observations of the semantic
complex which may only achieve accountability as secondary or tertiary meta-critiques,
or a critique accounting for its own figuration with the tools provided by that figuration
itself.

Furthermore, this emerging meta-critique cannot stipulate a new or separate

register of “alterity” outside of the textability of the semantic or semiotic registers but
rather can only pressure the “turn” of the equation back upon itself: the dialogical turn of
the semantic register exfoliates as a recurring internal alter-nativity that remains native to
itself in discourse.
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Goux, Symbolic Economics, 20-21, expresses this as the “conjunction of the formal and the energetic at the root of
symbolic investment and its laws of structuration.”
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The shift from “sense” (homologous to Kant’s “sensibility”) to “sign”
(homologous to Kant’s “intelligibility”) alludes to the problematic question of the origin
or origin-ability of thought.
Contractual signs or words constitute the consensual contract of semantic
meaning (“con” – with and “sensus”, as agreed upon “sense” and now referred, signed
sense). As such, we identify two aspects of contractual words: (1) their consensus (see
“circulating” further forward) anticipates the imperative for the sense-to-sign leap of
“desire/faith” or more neutrally, of “psychic energy”; (2) counter-wise, the consensus or
agreement of meaning exfoliates Kant’s transcendental function as an already insinuated
faculty of thought, i.e., we cannot imagine a sense-sign “consensus” without a
transcendental function.

Yet, we must also observe that we cannot stipulate the

transcendental function without a consensual semantic: a semantic eccentric loop is
required to account for the empirical structure of discourse. That is, we discover in the
careful exfoliation of the semantic the “already given and taken” consensus of value in
the assignment of meaning figurations: this discovery reveals the problem of valuation
already indemnified and embedded in our assumption of meaning values. The semantic
has already been ante-posed by, indeed, predicated upon a “givenness” of meaning-value
and moreover this semantic register implies a given if not purely measurable “economic.”
Our arrival, indeed, our revival, at this status has occurred prior to our
investigation and therefore the explication of a semantic of meaning will require a
conceptualization of the meaning function which both anticipates and exceeds that
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function itself. An economics of the semantic is required, what Jean-Joseph Goux terms
“…a genealogy of values…[or] the genesis of the value form.”95 Goux traces the four
stages of his conceptualization of this genealogy, first in Marx’s theory of economic
value and then, alternatively, in Freud’s four stages of child development:
Marx

Freud

Phase I:
Elementary or accidental form of value:

Oral Stage

Phase II:
Total or extended form of value

Anal Stage

Phase III:
Generalized form of value

Phallic Stage

Phase IV:
Money for of value

Genital Stage

Goux’s analysis proposes a plausible theory for the genealogy of valuation for the
semantic register, yet curiously, it also exfoliates the suggestion of what we are
stipulating is the requirement for a more complete economics of signification, that is as
well a genealogy of symptomatically implied semiotic value. In somewhat homologous
references as Deleuze’s “contracted” and “circulated” words, Goux stipulates:
Now these processes of replacement and trade are neither disconnected nor
disorganized. Repeated and systematic substitution acts to structure the world of
exchangeable elements with reference to certain distinctive poles. In the play of
symptoms, equivalents, and metaphors, certain privileged elements take over
and, in a standardized (social, universal) fashion, govern the process of
circulation. …In certain points of condensation, values seem to gather,
capitalize, centralize itself, investing certain elements with a privileged
representativeness and even with a monopoly on representativeness within the
diverse set of which they are members. The mysterious genesis of this privilege
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is effaced, leaving their monopoly absolute, absolved, exempted in their
transcendent role as standard and measure of values.96

“Processes of replacement and trade…in a standardized social-universal fashion” appear
to be homologous to “contracted” semantic processes; “…repeated and systematic
substitution…structure…exchangeable elements…” appears homologous to “circulated”
words. But then Goux curiously alludes to the play, “this drift of value objects, of
interchangeable parts from which a hierarchy (of values) develops, a principle of order
and subordination…”97 – as such Goux is alluding to the energetic economic shift which
forces the event of instantiation. He proceeds to then stipulate that this event constitutes
a new and more energetic regime “…

which places the great (manifold and

polymorphous) majority of “signs” (products, actions and gestures, subjects, objects)
under the sacred command of a select few among them.” The analysis observes the
expansion of signed regimes to more powerful and energetic hierarchies of signification
which precipitate two insights: First, Goux is inserting into the equation the force of
sense upon the sign; Second, he is asserting that the now signed-sense of “…products,
actions and gestures, subjects, objects…” can achieve “command” and even “monopoly”
over the now instantiated hierarchies of the sign regime. Goux appears to be stipulating
that this is a function of meaning which underlies the formation of, e.g., Marx’s
monopoly capital, and which is attributable not as a new a priori structure but rather as
the internal sense-to-sign event which precipitates first the possibility of initial
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intelligibility but then the inevitability of empowered intelligibility, that is as Goux’s
meta-sense, as intelligibility accounting for its own economic. The four-stage process
(either Marx’s economic or Freud’s psychodynamic) thus traces “the mysterious genesis
of this privilege” of value which would account for the shift from “commodity- or usevalue” to “exchange-value” to “universal equivalent” (for the Freudian register the shift
from “oral-identification” to “anal-generalized” to “phallic-singular equivalent” and
finally to the “genital-elision of the phallus via castration to general or complete psychic
organization”).98
Regarding gold as an “overestimated” economic universal equivalent, Goux via
Marx raises the eccentric loop question which reveals “the reversal, the “false
semblance” intrinsic to gold’s “fetishistic character”: that is, to paraphrase, “…is the
commodity valued by a gold standard because all commodities have consensually been
valued by gold, or conversely, have commodities come to be valued by gold simply
because it is gold …?”99 To unpack the implication of this paradox, has gold, gold that is
now transvalued as money, now assumed a virtual-actualized status which bears its own
economic momentum?
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Ibid, pp. 22-23.
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Ibid, p. 33, “Hence the reversal, the “false-semblance,” the “magic of money.” Out of every oblivion of the genesis
of the general equivalent form arises an overestimation of its role. This is the “fetishistic character” or “fetishistic
illusion” that is imprinted upon precious metals by the money form. Likewise, in the sexual domain, according to
Lacan, the organ that is invested with a privileged signifying function “acquires a fetishistic value.” “What happens is,
not that a commodity assumes the aspect of money because all other commodities universally express their values in it;
but the converse of this, that they universally appear to express their values in it because it is money.”[Marx, Capital: A
Critique of the Political Economy, trans. from the 4th German edition by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, 2 vols., New York:
E.P. Dutton, 1930, 69 (Goux’s emphasis added), 68, 69, 57; Lacan, Ecrits, 694; Marx, Capital, 68.]

77

We note for future reference for the study of religion Goux’s observation that “In
the commercial register, we can affirm that commodities used as currency have included
shells, salt blocks, furs, wheat, rice, livestock, mean, silver and gold in powder or ingots,
and finally gold pieces of officially guaranteed weight and worth – a list that hardly
differs from an inventory of perverse fixations, up to the advent of normalcy…”100 and in
particular we want to remind ourselves of the homologous claim by Mircea Eliade that “It
is unlikely that there is any animal or any important species of plant in the world that has
never had a place in religion. In the same way too, every trade, art, industry and
technical skill either began as something holy, or has, over the years, been invested with
religious value.”101
This description, however, while accounting for the expression and genesis of
value on the semantic register, nonetheless tends to exceed itself, or to require a further
explication of the value function when Goux observes and quotes Marx’s apparent
capitulation to the difficulty of defining a final value to the capital register: “But, adds
Marx, “the whole mystery of the form of values lies hidden” even in the most
“elementary form, and its analysis is our fundamental difficulty.”102 Is Marx desiring a
phantom a priori value, or in his eloquent semantic abstraction of das capital is he
obscuring the eccentric semiotic loop’s alternative but omnipresent economic? We note

100

Ibid, 32.

101

Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, New York: Meridian Books, 1965, 1.

102

Ibid, 32, Goux is quoting Marx, Capital, p. 29, (Goux’s emphasis added), Capital, 18.

78

this for future reference, but use it to introduce the imperative for an alter-native semiotic
economic.
That is, because the eccentric semantic loop occurs as a restrained consensus103 its
value or economic force appears not to be equatable to the semantic register itself but is
rather its consensus is only observable as emergently catalyzed. We can merely antepose in our observation that “…it is as if…” the indefinite energy and momentum of
“sense” is “condensed” or “displaced,” to use Freud’s terms, and whose now only
energetic “trace” is carried in the equation in the “con” of “consensus.” Consensus infers
an agreement of multiple and possibly differing views, opinions, stances, but also, from
the economic side of the equation, differing weighting or energetic emphasis of the terms
of definition.

The restrained consensus of meaning values in the semantic register

implies the attempted “synthesis” (from a Kantian perspective, which may tend to overweight the instantiation of the sign) or “erasure” (from a Derridian perspective, which
may tend to over-weight the potential erasure of difference of the sense-to-sign function)
of difference in the resultant signatures, though Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of
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We note simply that consensus requires psychological output in order to arrive at agreement, whether explicit
agreement or graduated (via circulation) consensus achieved in the use of language terms; Freud develops the concept
of “cathexis” and “counter-cathexis” to account for the expenditure of psychic energy required to first “cathect” or
connect to the object of attention but then a countering, complementary cathectic energy required to be able to either
distinguish or disconnect and thus differentiate psychic activity to other objects: “Restraint of motor discharge (of
action) had now become necessary, and was provided by means of the process of thought, which was developed from
ideation. Thought was endowed with qualities which made it possible for the mental apparatus to support increased
tension during a delay in the process of discharge. It is essentially an experimental way of acting, accompanied by
displacement of smaller quantities of cathexis together with less expenditure (discharge) of them. For this purpose
conversion of free cathexis into “bound” cathexes was imperative, and this was brought about by means of raising the
level of the whole cathectic process. It is probably that thinking was originally unconscious, in so far as it rose above
mere ideation and turned to the relations between the object-impressions, and that it became endowed with further
qualities which were perceptible to consciousness only through its connection with the memory-traces of words.”
(Freud, “Two Principles of Mental Functioning (1911),” in General Psychological Theory Papers on Metapsychology,
ed. and intro. Philip Rieff, New York: Collier Books, 1963, 24.)
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“disjunctive synthesis”104 is likely more accurate to the equation – the “synthesis” offers
a surface condition of agreement, while the still disjunctive sub-surface economic is more
or less successfully suppressed (and we would suggest it is also heightened by a psychic
energy of semantic and semiotic empowerment). We can recall Ibrahim’s question from
Global Theology Fall 2009: “How can it be that five Islamic scholars, born into the same
language, can read the same Koran and disagree so radically on its meaning?,” or
Jonathan Z. Smith’s observation of James H. Leuba’s text Psychological Study of
Religion regarding the internal confusion and multiplicity of the definitions of “religion”
which Leuba notes results in “…more than fifty definitions of religion…”105 The surface
restrained synthesis appears to be able to retain a radical (and residually psychic and
energetic) and latent disjunctiveness.
Yet the force of consensus of the “meaning” of a term must itself be intrinsic to
the question of the functionality of this ante-posed “register of sense” which now
becomes signed as signed-sense. The expanded theatre of sense to sign-sense achieved
by desire’s register would not be plausible without the “force” of consensus. That is,
restrained or forced consensus cannot merely be observed as a conspiracy of the
speaker(s) but also must implicate the conspiracy of an ante-posed sense itself to gain its
now expanded and unfolding semantic sensibility.
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However, we can observe that this forced consensus reveals the condition of
instantiation as potentially unstable. Minimally, the instantiation of the sign renders an
“epi-genetic” and functional instability to the semantic register – i.e., its vulnerability to
debate and deconstructive critique. Maximally, the instantiation of the sign exposes the
semantic register as vulnerable to not just deconstructive critique but more radically to
the shadow of what we can speculate as the dis-instantiation of meaning registered in the
extreme conditions of psychosis and schizophrenia on the personal level, or surfacing in,
e.g., Sudhir Kakar’s analysis of the “…colors of violence”106 on the global cultural level.
We contend that these “zones of instability,” as also exfoliated by Homi Bhabha’s
“…location of culture…”107 may be accounted for by a revisioned theory of the semantic
and semiotic registers and specifically of the instantiation and disinstantiation of the sign.
Instantiation constitutes the potentiation of the sense to sign function and coincides with a
structural semantic analysis; disinstantiation constitutes the de-potentiation of the sense to
sign or sign back to sense function and coincides with the post-structural analysis; both
are, however, emergent on the same semantic and semiotic field. We are remanding
thought to an ante-posed depth that prescinds from structural deconstruction, that is we
are claiming a semantic and semiotic economics to the epistemological registers of
thinking.
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Initial summary of the eccentric loop semantic: The semantic strange loop may
compose a consensual, contractual foreground to the description of the meaning function,
yet this consensus is always, by empirical observation, subject to the semantic economic
equation from which it emerges. Derrida’s critique, in particular, focuses on the semantic
eccentric loop and the consequences, both intended and unintended, when a full
accounting of this function is desired.
Native consequence: contracted words, by consensus, and hence circulating
words, by their repetition in more or less consensual use, facilitate the semantic
structure of the meaning function; the semantic field, however, is always open to
its semantic background constituted in multiple and indefinite semantic
definitions of discursive structures, their consequent applications and circulating
repetitions of semantic meaning structures in this use and repetition in culture.
Furthermore, the anticipated and therefore intended consequence of this open
semantic field is the expectation of the open and competitive interpretive field,
i.e., what, for example, Ricoeur stipulates as the “hermeneutic.”108 The discourse
of “…religion(s)…the religious…” can function in this open field but is of course
subject to the eccentric semantic loop, the open discursive field, and the
consequent interpretive field.

Alter-native consequence:

However, the eccentric semantic loop further

exfoliates, in the particular study of “…religion(s)…the religious…” the empirical
108
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omnipresence of an alternative eccentric loop background, that is Smith’s and
Raschke’s interpretive insinuation of the third term of “religio,” or the function of
the “boundedness…to… .” That is, the first two terms of “religio,” “to read or reread…an oral or textual discourse,” and “to practice…rite or ritual,” present
observable references for study. Yet the unique and eccentric insinuation of
“boundedness…to…” both in the intentionality of the first two terms and in the
definition of the third term itself implicates, in the claim and desire of the
academic study of religion, an eccentric loop semiotic background of symbol and
symptom.

That is, the semiotic structure of the semantic unintentionally

implicates an alter-native loop to possible so-called “religious” meaning when it
self-imposes “the question of the sacred…of God or gods…etc.” by requiring
discourse which can only be carried by portmanteau references.
To summarize the eccentric, negotiated, restrained, valued semantic loop:
Eccentric: Semantic terms are already ante-posed in a contingent context of other
terms. That is, clear and symmetric definition is always challenged by the
requirement that a term be defined by other terms which themselves have multiple
usages and definitions. The “meaning” of a term is therefore rhizomically109
embedded in language; moreover, a term is always carried to the scene of
language by a speaker, who brings his or her own “context” of meaning. To
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reiterate Eco, “Semiosis explains itself by itself; this continual circularity is the
normal condition” of the semantic and semiotic registers.
Negotiated: Terms nonetheless “achieve” definition, either in lexicons or in usage
or in the organic inter-face of both.

This explication of “negotiation” itself

represents a coagulation, a “coming together,” and hence a consensus, more or
less, of negotiated terms. I am negotiating with you the reader the accuracy of
this accounting system and my writing and your reading enables a negotiation of
meaning and usage. Because of the other factors (eccentric, restrained, valued) of
the semantic loop, this negotiation is ongoing and under constant and preferably
diligent critique and revision.
Restrained: The “eccentric” and “negotiated” attributes of the semantic loop
themselves suggest a subtle semantic and psychic economic to the semantic
register. That is, we must include accompanying “force” references (if only
metaphorical) to account for the psychic energy required to perform the functions
of consensus or negotiation.

Semantic restraint is apparent in group speech

situations as one must restrain oneself to “listen,” to at least heuristically consider
the other speakers’ possible alternative definitions and usages of terms. This
attribute must be acting systematically, if eccentrically, in the group psyche as all
speakers listen heuristically and then participate in speech. Or, restraint may also
be apparent as the reader strains to grasp, comprehend, e.g., this text. Semantic
definition requires focus, concentration, and energy with which to discern and
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explicate the intense foregrounding of “terms”. Or, from an alternative angle,
terms constitute at least provisional term-inations of the semantic/semiotic
process – to observe from the composite of these attributes, terms achieve
explication only in their eccentric – negotiated – restrained – and valued
termination.
Valued:

Negotiation and the strain/restrain of terms/terminations thus imply

intrinsic value(s) to the semantic/semiotic register – expression proposes (and
ante-poses) both a semantic or lexiconal meaning value(s) to a term or set of
terms but this textual value would always be to some degree of value negotiated
and it would always be attended by an economic or psychic value, though of
course “both” values merge in a composite valuation.
As such, we are asserting an economics to the semantic register which opens the
table to both semantic deconstruction but, alternatively, to semantic disinstantiation.
The former more or less critiques the structural and definitional variability to terms and
meanings involved from linguistic interpretation, while the latter insinuates an economics
of energetic or force to the sense-to-sign event.

Both must be essential to a full

accounting of the meaning register.
This brief deconstruction of a postulated eccentric semantic loop following
Goux’s intriguing treatment of Marx’s materialist economic culture and Freud’s stages of
infantile development leaves us suspiciously exposed to the dangers of the fetish, indeed,
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of the “fetishistic investment of the meaning structure…”110 Yet, curiously, because of
Marx’s own frustration with the question of “value” itself, on the other edge of the sword
we must confess that we are left expectantly desiring a fuller accountability of its genesis:
it would appear that this lack of intelligibility expresses a more perilous event horizon, a
background still lurking. While Marx will endeavor to “discover the origin of the money
form” and by implication the valuation of the general equivalent in the deconstructive
analysis of the semantic process which ensues from the “erasure of a genesis, the
obliteration of a history…,”111 that is to explain the origin of a general equivalent of
ultimacy in the social-economic materiality of culture, we will attempt to claim that what
is observed as necessary for the completion of the equation of the meaning-value of the
general equivalent is the re-dress of the semantic analysis to an analysis of the eccentric
semiotic loop implied internally in the eccentric semantic loop. This second analysis
does not make a claim of ultimacy but rather suggests that the empirical analysis of the
semantic and semiotic registers are not completed or fully conceivable without an
internally implicated alter-native eccentric semiotic loop.
The Eccentric, Non-Negotiated, Unrestrained Transvalued Semiotic Loop
An eccentric semiotic loop exfoliates as the internalizing alter-native implied in
the examination of the eccentric loop semantic study of “…religion(s)…the religious…”
This alternative eccentric field, we claim, alludes to what has at times been traditionally
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symptomatized as “the theological.”

So-called religious studies is implausible, by

definition and by its empirical evidence, without this alternative eccentric loop which
would exfoliate the “…boundedness …to… .” This insight is gained by the empirical
examination of the eccentric loop semantic and our larger objective for a full
accountability of the possible field of the meaning register.

We are therefore not

claiming a “new” vision of “…religion…religions…the religious…” but rather we are
proposing a re-visioning of the discipline’s approach to discourse.
If the sense-to-sign event of meaning achieves an expanded economics as the
mere visual sensory input of “▲” expands into a vastly “new” sensory topography, that
of the indefinite field of the full language-set, then we have substantially increased the
ante of the semantic and semiotic equation. That is, we noted a native consequence of
this subtle shift from sense to sign requires the analytical observation that the register and
economy of sense has been expanded by engaging the sign-sense semantic register, what
we have described as the consensual and circulated function of meaning terms. However,
the alter-native consequence intrinsic to the total equation stipulates that both the total
field of sense and the total field of signed-sense discourse appear sited in internalized
indefinite topographies.

First, so-called “sense” is always “sense of…” but “sense

of…‘this’…‘▲’ ” which “stands-in” or in-stances in the totalizing context of “ ‘▲’ and
all that is ‘not-▲’ ”: before any “sign of sense” we must observe that there is the
equation of the differentiation of sense, difference as such. (We note the mis-fortune of
our already embedded ante, our “bet,” that is that “difference” is now already “termed,”
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anteed, “not” as pure “difference” BUT difference as signed-sense ‘difference.’) Sense is
already anteed as differentiation: the “order” of sense is difference. Thus “▲” figures
the foreground of the sensed “object” differentiated in contrast to its totalizing field in
order to sense: again, the order of sense is difference. Deleuze will assert that “how”
the philosophical arts believes it can elect to posit, characterize, to describe, and to
account for this “order of sense” makes all the “difference:”
…thought is that moment in which determination makes itself one, by virtue of
maintaining a unilateral and precise relation to the indeterminate. Thought
‘makes’ difference, but difference is monstrous. …To rescue difference from its
maledictory state seems, therefore, to be the project of the philosophy of
difference.
…Difference must leave its cave and cease to be a monster; or at least only that
which escapes at the propitious moment must persist as a monster, that which
constitutes only a bad encounter, a bad occasion. At this point the expression
‘make the difference’ changes its meaning. It now refers to a selective test which
must determine which differences may be inscribed within the concept in
general, and how. 112

That difference would express, and be expressed, as such instantiates the event of
a sense of difference differentiating as sign but this differentiation constitutes both an
event which in-stances the equation of an ante-position of the equation “ ‘▲’ and all that
is ‘not-▲’ ” but in so doing changes the value of pure or ante-imaged difference itself:
the sense to sign event transvalues difference to the differentiated meaning register.
Deleuze’s “propitious moment” accounts for this event and demarcates the event horizon
of meaning differentiating from the sense of difference.
Yet we must note that the “▲” that in-stances cannot exclude its total equation, or
“ ‘▲’ and all that is ‘not-▲’ .” Thus “…all that is ‘not-▲’ ” stands in the now
112
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transvalued image as the implied background of “▲” because “▲” cannot be potentiated
absent its background. Furthermore, the energetic momentum of the instantiating turn
cannot be negotiated, again, because the image “▲” cannot be potentiated absent its
contrast in the total background set. Thus from this ante-posed totalizing equation results
the observed characteristics of the semiotic loop: eccentric, non-negotiated, unrestrained,
transvalued:
Eccentric: The image “ ‘▲’ and all that is ‘not-▲’ ” figures “▲” in
contrast to “all that is ‘not-▲’ ” but we cannot measure its force nor
qualify the attributes of the contrast because it is already given. The
equation antes itself as it contrasts. The instantiating shift is therefore
figured as now “▲” more or less contrasted to “all that is ‘not-▲’. ”
“‘▲’ and all that is ‘not-▲’ ” cannot be figured therefore as two static
poles but rather must be given as the horizons of possible difference as
differentiation, or difference differentiating. The “propitious moment”
initiates on this horizon of the event of “ ‘▲’ and all that is ‘not-▲’ .”
Quantitatively, the event thus projects an eccentric energy – we cannot
fully measure or determine the economic exchange generated by the
energy of the contrast. (We might play or propose heuristically that the
equation “oscillates” but this occurs after the fact of the event.)
Qualitatively, the image results in an exchange of the contrasting
functions’ foreground “▲” standing in and against its background “…all
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that is ‘not-▲’ ” yet the contrasting horizons cannot be disconnected
quantitatively nor disassociated qualitatively: the event horizon therefore
persists as an eccentric alter-nating differentiating equation.
Non-negotiated: The setting of the event has not merely already occurred
but is already occurring as we encounter the equation. But, alternatively,
we could say that the equation constitutes the event horizon which
precipitates the subject itself. The event horizon figures a fielded
instantiation of the image(s) which we can attribute as “subjectivity” but
any subject cannot negotiate this event horizon of “ ‘▲’ and all that is
‘not-▲’ ” because “it” as the subject is only itself figured as a
symptomatic figure or figuring of the equation.

Subjectivity thus

eventuates after the fact of the event horizon and its energy and attributes
cannot be negotiated except through secondary re-figuring and
revisioning.
Un-restrained: As the alternative to the restrained semantic loop, the
unrestrained “dimension” of the general equation (the semantic/semiotic)
accounts for the indefinite background of “…all that is ‘not-▲’ ”
contrasted to the restrained “▲.” Terms such as “universe” figure this
alternativity, as both a restrained sign of “physical being” or as the “time
and space” of all that is purported to be, yet this restrained reference
remains penultimate to the possibility of the indeterminate extension of
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such a physical being in a time and space that, by ironic definition, remand
their definition to their indeterminate background. The event horizon
figured by the restrained semantic and the unrestrained semiotic equation
constitutes what could be stipulated as the grenzbegriff or boundary of
what science can empirically conceive and is of course stated by Anselm’s
“…that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” “God,” as an
analogous expression of “universe,” designates an actual intra-textual
expression of the restrained/unrestrained semantic/semiotic: the goal of a
fully expressive paradigm of the semantic and semiotic would appear to
necessitate this observation. Indeed, the expression appears to self-assert
from the ante-posited play of the equation.
Transvalued:

The valuation intrinsic to consensual and circulated

semantic terms nonetheless rests upon the alter-native potential expressed
above in the eccentric, non-negotiated and unrestrained general equation.
To reverse Anselm’s equation, the restrained expressions which result
from “ ‘▲’

and all that is ‘not-▲’ ” have already transformed the

potential of the statement from that which is seemingly inexpressible or
incommensurable to a statement that now semantically “expresses” this
“fact.” This semantic configuration of the inexpressible may serve to
account for language as symptomatic rather than merely expressive and it
thereby addresses the “other” alternative “definition” of “semiotic” which
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can refer to both “the study of signs” but also can refer to the “study of
symptoms.” Or, we might say that the sign itself carries this alternating
symptomatic potential.

That is, the sign can be valued as a specific

restrained figure of referred meaning but the sign can also refer to an
ultra-sign of a non-designatable symptom.

In physical medicine,

deciphering physical symptoms represents the art of diagnosis; for
psychology, however, the reading of the patient’s total narrative involves
potentiating what may be only vaguely figured (if at all) in physical and
psychological symptoms to a diagnosis which itself may not be
comprehensive even over a lifetime.

Freud stressed the inability to

translate the expressions or valuation of the “un-conscious”: even the
term “unconscious” constitutes an ante-posed, restrained, after-the-fact
and indeed penultimate reference to that which expresses the dream.
Freud speaks of the indecipherable “navel” intrinsic in every dream which
remains embedded in the dream but which resists translation:
expression of the inexpressible.113

113

the

Derrida observes that in Freud’s

“By turning Freud’s hermeneutics of suspicion back on his own text, one discovers, not the transparency of selfreflexivity, but a fault in the mirror of reflection. …In analyzing one of his own dreams, Freud glimpses a blind spot
that simultaneously resists and solicits interpretation. Acknowledging what he would rather ignore, he supplements his
narrative with a “revealing” footnote that effectively subverts his analysis. “I had a feeling that the interpretation of
this part of the dream was not carried far enough to make it possible to follow the whole of its concealed meaning. If I
had pursued my comparison between [sic] the three women, it would have taken me far afield. There is at least one
spot in every dream at which it is unplumbable – a navel, as it were, that is its point of contact with the unknown.”
[Freud, Sigmund, Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James Strachey, New York: Avon Books, 1965, 311-312] This
remarkable admission implies that every interpretation is incomplete because consciousness is doubled by an
unconscious that not only is unknown but remains unknowable. As the point of contact with the unknown, the navel of
the dream is the trace of the unrepresentable that every representation presupposes but cannot re-present. (Mark
Taylor, After God, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 184.)
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method of dream interpretation “there is never a relation of simple
translation…” from the unconscious image to conscious expression, and
he pressures this observation further by suggesting that “what” cannot be
translated is “the value of presence” of the unconscious image or the
projected, ante-posed unconscious itself.114 But this “value” cannot be
exclusive to the “dream” or the “unconscious” but rather stipulates the
latent boundary, but the expressed latent boundary, of the event horizon of
the semantic/semiotic configuration of meaning itself:

all expression

carries this embedded horizon and hence all expression potentiates
transvaluation.

We are suggesting that the language event tends to

transvalue but conserve the equation “ ‘▲’ and all that is ‘not-▲’ ” in the
economics of the expression because the originary horizon of the equation
cannot be cancelled in its expression.

This transvaluation persists as

potential symptom in any expression.115
Therefore, this event must be economically efficient in its psychic conservation of
the energy of expression, that is the pre-semantic/pre-semiotic energy of sense cannot be
lost or diminished but rather must be condensed or trans-valued to a new concentrated
114

Jacques Derrida, Freud and the Scene of Writing, in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1978, 210-211.
115

Deleuze alludes to this transvaluative dynamic: “When we say that the sound becomes independent, we mean to say
that it ceases to be a specific quality attached to bodies, a noise or a cry, and that it begins to designate qualities,
manifest bodies, and signify subjects or predicates. …sound takes on a conventional value inside denotation, a
customary value in manifestation, and an artificial value in signification, only because it establishes its independence at
the surface from the higher authority of expressivity. The depth-surface distinction is, in every respect, primary in
relation to the distinctions nature-convention, nature-custom, or nature-artifice.” (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 187.)
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energy field, i.e., sign-sense. However, sign-sense, while energetically condensed sense,
nonetheless now eventuates as sense transvalued to sign-sense which also by definition
semantically and semiotically condenses and displaces the total equation of difference.
That is, pure ante-imaged “difference” must be both conserved in its expression but also
continue to prescind from this expression: deriving from the total field of “ ‘▲’ and all
that is ‘not-▲’ ” it must express and conserve de facto that total field as it is energetically
projected to the semantic and semiotic register which we have observed itself carries both
a consensual and circulated registration but also conserves by condensation the total field
by as well projecting and carrying the totalized originary field of difference.

Any

expression (of difference) is both determinate and alter-natively in-determinate because
the totalized semantic/semiotic register must derive from the totalized differential field.
The alter-native consequence of the expression of difference is the requirement for a
composite semantic/semiotic total energetic critique.
For example, we might postulate that the “difference” between what we have
observed as the semantic and semiotic registers could be conceptualized as a kind of
“dialectic alterity” of thought. Yet what we discerned is the overlap and over-gapping
“between” the “two” (e.g., the consensual, circulated “thetic” terms up against the
contrasted antithetic of portmanteau terms; in the equation of religion, rite and text
“versus” the portmanteau “…bounded, boundedness.”) and while their distinction offered
certain heuristic advantages, we found their clear difference to be problematic. This
insight

persists

in

the

symptoms

of
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the

differences

in

the

terms

“…religion…religions…the religious…” and makes the discipline of religious studies
uniquely vulnerable to an unrestrained or total critique.
We may assert then that the “problem” of meaning derives from the very equation
of difference which meaningful thought subsumes but which already and paradoxically
prescinds from thought. Thus Deleuze’s observation that “thought ‘makes’ difference,
but difference is monstrous.” Here the rather philosophically imprecise and radical
adjective “monstrous” is left intentionally open to the reader’s thought – in the term
“monstrous” Deleuze appears to intentionally project an excessive force to the text. This
includes a range of definitions which fall into five general genres of both qualitative and
quantitative attribution: (1) abnormal in size (qualitative); (2) abnormal in biological
structure as in plants and animals (quantitative); (3) outrageous, atrocious, shocking
(qualitative); (4) huge, as in a monstrous fire (quantitative); (5) of or relating to or
resembling a monster (qualitative/quantitative).116

And from its reference in the

thesaurus we encounter an even broader territory:
1. outrageous, shocking, evil, horrifying, vicious, foul, cruel, infamous, intolerable,
disgraceful, scandalous, atrocious, inhuman, diabolical, heinous….
outrageous good, kind, fine, decent, mild, admirable, honourable, humane, merciful
2. huge, giant, massive, great, towering, vast, enormous, tremendous, immense,
titanic, gigantic, mammoth, colossal, stellar (informal), prodigious, stupendous,
gargantuan, puny…
3. unnatural, terrible, horrible, dreadful, abnormal, obscene, horrendous, hideous,
grotesque, gruesome, frightful, hellish, freakish, fiendish, miscreated...117

116

Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003.

117

Collins Thesaurus of the English Language – Complete and Unabridged 2nd Edition. 2002 © HarperCollins
Publishers 1995, 2002.
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Parenthetically, we can observe that the term “monstrous” thus adjectivally injects a
sense of overdetermined force to any subsequent derived or “determined” meaning, and
from a literary perspective is reminiscent of God’s emphatic speech at the conclusion of
the Book of Job.
However, more curious than the ante-postulation of “monstrous” to the thought of
difference is Deleuze’s assertion in the next paragraph that: “…Difference must leave its
cave and cease to be a monster; or at least only that which escapes at the propitious
moment must persist as a monster… At this point the expression ‘make the difference’
changes its meaning. It now refers to a selective test which must determine which
differences may be inscribed within the concept in general, and how.” The “propitious
moment” constitutes the event horizon of the sense-to-sign transvaluation: instantiated
meaning can now be at once economically overdetermined (indeterminate) yet
semantically and semiotically determined. In order to critique the total equation of a
thought or philosophy of difference the critique exposes itself to the ante-posed order of
difference: “…a total critique recognizes no restraints, no limits on its power, and is
therefore necessarily insurrectional…”118 Yet such a critique is nevertheless ironically
“already caught,” or to use Deleuze’s image of the dice-throw, “already thrown” in the
ante-position of a thought laboring in the semantic and semiotic meaning register. This
eccentric economic configuration insinuates a trans-valuing loop to the register of
thought.
118

Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, Minneapolis: U. Of Minnesota Press, 1993, 29.
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Recognition of a concept of instantiation as the momentum of sense-to-sign
already (its ante) includes its own interior potential for disinstantiation as the return of the
sign to its pre-sense, but this potential itself figures as a next instantiation, i.e., its
repetition as difference. The efficiency of this momentum figures instantiation as a
symptomatic event-horizon of meaning which now must be characterized as both
energetic (economic) as well as semantic and semiotic.

Meaning is therefore both

overwhelmed by the monstrosity of difference as sense but nonetheless expressed in the
terms of signed-sense.
And so we posit the question: What” constitutes the monstrosity of a thought of
difference?

In the abstract, Job’s metaphorical depiction notwithstanding, we have

expressed the monstrous as the equation of “ ‘▲’ and all that is ‘not-▲’ .” This
equation is a condensed, radically abstracted configuration of Lonergan’s “full set of
answers” or Anselm’s “…that than which nothing greater can be conceived,” each of
which offer examples of the extreme condensation of the ante-posed total equation of
difference – the commensurable expression of the incommensurably inexpressible, as
such.

In a radically cosmological “sense” we might imagine this figuration as the

gossamer thin global surface and atmosphere, i.e., the inhabited physical “foreground,”
differentiated against the entire potentiated universe, the extreme background. However,
we encounter the monstrosity of this figuration when we attempt to account for the
“universe” as a conceivable term at all, as having a definitive space or time. In fact, as
we found in our discussion of the “unrestrained,” the term “universe” constitutes an
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infinite and portmanteau term insinuated into determinate speech which both restrains the
thought of ultimate difference but also expresses it – it constitutes the embeddedness of
the radical indeterminate background within the register.
We will labor the reader to these various Deleuzian quotes in order to provide an
experiential exercise of the complexity of “terming” the problematic of any anteed
“difference.” And we would suggest that Deleuze’s style intentionally confronts the
reader with the sensory and signed complexity and convolution of the register itself: his
title Difference and Repetition abstractly remonstrates “difference” as already embedded
in an economics of energetic “repetition” – difference itself, though already anteed as
“explicated” “difference,” “is” rather, again, de facto “inexplicable” or to use our
terminology ante-explicable: Difference, as a semantic/semiotic term, abstractly yet
sublimely expresses the havoc and monstrosity of thought itself, but we are left with
Deleuze’s question: “…But does not difference as catastrophe precisely bear witness to
an irreducible ground which continues to act under the apparent equilibrium of organic
representation?”119
Summary of the Eccentric Semantic / Semiotic Loops
These alter-native (each “native” at once to meaning) surfaces of the semantic
and semiotic register can be imagined to work within language in a fashion similar to
Deleuze’s image of the Mobius strip in which “sense” and “sign” hold simultaneously, or
to use Zizek’s more radical term, paralaxically.

119

Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, 35.
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The semantic/semiotic parallax derives from the projection of the eccentric,
economic, monstrous equation “ ‘▲’ and all that is ‘not-▲’ ” within the register.
Intense strain and restraint notwithstanding, the monstrous equation defies the exclusion
of “either” dimension to the terms and images of thought and therefore the composite
equation is expressed either explicitly in the formal register or latently as depth
symptoms. The monstrous equation thus constitutes the exceptional compossibility120 to
the full dimensionality of the semantic/semiotic register. So as surface or semantic terms
themselves – “two” “ante—signifieds/signifiers” which hold on a “singular” surface – the
Mobius image of thought is both determinate or finite, a loop, yet it is infinite or
indefinite, unending, and its image furthermore de-termines the intrinsic indeterminate
nativity and compossibility of the register: indeterminate because, as terms move along
its surface it cannot be “determined” (without contractual or informal restraint) “which”
surface of the text, the determinate or the indeterminate, is at this moment surfacing. So
not only can we not break open the Mobius surface but we can say that the Mobius
surface is investigating itself – hence the eccentric semantic loop textualizes the surface
of a more eccentric semiotic loop but their composite nativity potentiates an extreme if
latent economics to thought. This potential would seem to tend to persist within the sign-

120

“The expressed world is made of differential relations and of contiguous singularities. It is formed as a world
precisely to the extent that the series which depend on each singularity converge with the series which depend on
others. This convergence defines “compossibility” as the rule of a world synthesis. Where the series diverge, another
world begins, incompossible with the first. The extraordinary notion of compossibility is thus defined as a continuum
of singularities, whereby continuity has the convergence of series as its ideational criterion….The inherence of
predicates in the expressive monad presupposes the compossibility of the expressed world which, in turn, presupposes
the distribution of pure singularities according to the rules of convergence and divergence. These rules belong to a
logic of sense and the event, and not to a logic of predication and truth.” (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 110-111.)
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sense register.

The flight of aircraft into structures which symbolized secular

semanticized economic power marked the event horizon of this latent potential and no
doubt was expressed and announced at the propitious moment by the emergent terms
“Allahu Akbar…”
Careful consideration of the semantic register reveals its consensual/contractual
and circulating status as a register of meaning on the one hand, yet as Derrida and
Deleuze and Eco imply, can we apply the semantic register to fully account for the
semantic register? What we have termed the “eccentric loop” quality is similar to Kurt
Gödel’s undecidability theorem in the mathematical register, i.e., that the principles of
mathematics cannot be used to validate or verify mathematics. This insight does not
immobilize thought but rather opens our thinking to more radical possibilities of
accountability, that is, an economics of exchange “between” these surfaces. Thought
now requires a conceptual framework with which to account for these empirical
eccentricities.
Further, we must acknowledge that what we have termed the semantic and
semiotic registers appear to be accountable only as an inclusive composite equation, or
what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a “common assemblage.”121

Undoing the

assemblage of the equation would be tantamount “…to breaking open and unfolding the

121

Inna Semetsky, “Semiotics,” The Deleuze Dictionary, Adrian Parr, editor, New York: Columbia University Press,
2005, 242.
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Mobius strip.”122 A revisioned concept of the register arises subject to the following

working insights:
1. The accountability of the meaning register has brought us to the distinction
(différance) of the semantic (contractual/consensual/circulating) foreground; the
exfoliation of this foreground, however, further requires the assignment of an
eccentric and overdetermined symptomatic semiotic background.
2. Transcendentalizing principle of the semantic:

the semantic register cannot

empirically account for itself without reference to a transcendental concept of its
eccentric excess.
3. Immanticizing principle of the semiotic: the semiotic register, which would carry
the assignment of reference to that which is in excess of the semantic register, is
itself nonetheless language or semantic-bound.
4. Accountability of these meaning registers has forced us to recognize an
intrinsically implied third loop, the paralaxical loop, similar for example to the
image of the Mobius strip, also homologous to the DNA helix. The complete
equation of the meaning register is constituted in the paralaxical register which,
theoretically, may at the minimum provide a semantic register with which to
address this possible composite equation.
5. We

can

suspect

that

the

equation

of

the

semantic

(contracted/consensual/circulating foreground) +/- the semiotic background may
be intrinsically unstable.
122

That is, while the “surface” micro-analytic

Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 123.
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representations of the semantic may be assigned a consensual stability, due to the
excessive eccentricity and economic energy of its semiotic background “depth”
we can, along with Freud or Marx or Nietzsche, or Derrida and Deleuze, etc.,
surmise a macro-analytic always lurking, that is by the definition of a principle of
complete accountability.

This interstitial instability may constitute the event

horizon of the meaning equation.
6. Finally, we must acknowledge that our request for a full accounting of the
meaning equation has a momentum which exceeds its own register: semantically,
we will term this excess the “register of desire”; semiotically, however, we
observe that this request, this desire for accountability, remains at this juncture an
open field or horizon.

The Copula & Caesura and the Exceptional Inception of Thought
“The caesura lies in thought itself: with the thinking of the meaning of meaning (total
reflection), a heterogeneous sphere of conditions must be at issue that precedes thinking
as the thinking of meaning (determinate reflection), and the thinking as the thinking of
being (external reflection), as well as the thinking as being (positing reflection). It is the
sphere of ‘pure heterogeneity’ which constitutes itself in itself as the logical
beginning.”123
But, once again, everything changes nature as it climbs to the surface. And it is
necessary to distinguish two ways whose personal identity is lost, two ways by means of
which the contradiction is developed. In depth, it is through infinite identity that
contraries communicate and that the identity of each finds itself broken and divided. This
makes each term at once the moment and the whole; the part, the relation, and the whole;
the self, the world, and God; the subject, the copula, and the predicate.124
There are no simple concepts…Even the first concept, the one with which a philosophy
“begins,” has several components, because it is not obvious that philosophy must have a
beginning, and if it does determine one, it must combine it with a point of view or a
123

Werner Flach, Negation und Andersheit: Ein Beitrag zur Problematik der Letztimplikation, Würzburg: Ernst
Reinhardt Verlag, 1959, 64; quoted by Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror, 88-90.
124

Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 175.
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ground [une raison]. Not only do Descartes, Hegel, and Feuerbach not begin with the
same concept, they do not have the same concept of beginning.125

The inflection of the copula126 “to be” in the instantiation of the subject-predicate
expression suggests an internal economics, the assertion of expressed force, of the
implied equation of the term. That is, there resides an exchange of both the implied
correlation or relation of subject to predicate and at the same time, on the same surfacing,
the energetic assertion of that relation or correlation. The proposition “The leaf is
green…” compresses the abstract semantic/semiotic equation “ ‘▲’ and all that is ‘not▲’ ” or “the equation of difference” to a meaningful statement. The predicate “green”
relates a sub-set of the term “leaf.” The copula “is,” however, instantiates the term “leaf”
with the term “green” as an energetic assertion: we do not say “the leaf green” but we
say “the leaf is green.”

The copula thus insinuates a subtle, energetic pause, the

caesura,127 between the terms. The proposition asserts that the “sense of leaf” correlates
to the “sense of green” but these senses must pause energetically between the terms of the
proposition. The senses of “leaf” and “green” are then formally asserted to carry an
exchangeable quantity and/or quality in the copula “is” while the subtle energetic
caesura, the pause of sense(s), implied between the senses exchanges the energetic
economic of the proposition. Difference is differentiated as the economic exchange of
125

Deleuze, What is Philosophy?, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 15-16.

126

(OED, V. 1, 977) Gram. and logic “That part of a proposition which connects the subject and predicate; the present
tense of the verb to be (with or without the negative) employed as a mere sign of predication.”
127

“1. (Literature / Poetry) (in modern prosody) a pause, esp. for sense, usually near the middle of a verse line. Usual
symbol 2. (Literature / Poetry) (in classical prosody) a break between words within a metrical foot, usually in the third
or fourth foot of the line.” (Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991,
1994, 1998, 2000, 2003).
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the heterology of sense(s). The inception of the proposition derives from the heterology
of sense.
But before the synthesis of the object “leaf” and the quality “green” the
heterology of sense has itself derived an originary specific “sense of leaf” against or in
contrast to the “leaf and all that is not the leaf” or what we have called the equation of
difference. Likewise for the term “green”: “Sense of green” is derived from “green and
all that is not green” or the non-sense of “green.” Deleuze terms this event horizon of
sense the passive genesis:
…We establish the two stages of the passive genesis. First, beginning with the
singularities-events which constitute it, sense engenders a first field (complexe)
wherein it is actualized: the Umwelt which organizes the singularities in circles
of convergence; individuals which express these worlds; states of bodies;
mixtures or aggregates of these individuals; analytic predicates which describe
these states. Then, a second, very different field (complexe) appears, built upon
the first: the Welt common to several or to all worlds; the persons who define
this “something in common”; synthetic predicates which define these persons;
and the classes and properties which derive from them. Just as the first stage of
the genesis is the work of sense, the second is the work of nonsense, which is
always co-present to sense (aleatory point or ambiguous sign): it is for this
reason that the two stages, and their distinction, are necessarily founded.128

“Thought” derives from the “pre-individual and impersonal transcendental play”
of sense vis à vis nonsense. The inception of thought derives from the exceptional play
of sense, i.e., “sense of green” excepting “all that is not green.” This exception must
imply an energetic economics of strain and restraint as sense labors to sense “leaf” or
“green” in contrast to “all that is not leaf…and all that is not green.” The exception of
sense is an energetics of restraint, yet always restraint in contrast to an unrestrained
background, non-sense. We cannot speak of sense without an efficiency of force or an
128

Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 116-117.
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energetics. The inception of sense constitutes a forced exception of sense, a determined
foreground in contrast to “its” indeterminate background. These insights themselves
derive not merely from “pure” or “pre-textual” sense but from and within their coimplication in what is now sign-sense: the inception and exception of sense expressed as
sign-sense. We cannot conceive of this line of the thought of sense without the surface of
sign-sense so we are caught and surfacing on the Mobius surface of sense/sign. “The
exceptional inception of sense constitutes the ante-posed (in this “sense,” the signedsense) of sense” but this statement is not possible without the sense of the sign. We are
on the surface of thought only because, paradoxically, we can both sense and sign. In
this sense we have discovered “sign-sense.”
Thought cannot thus determine the heterological ground of its inception in sense,
yet neither can sense assert a ground without the surface of heterological thought as
sense/sign-sense. Nonetheless, and this is a big “nonetheless,” from its exceptional
inception in sense/sign-sense thought asserts or would force a claim to that inception in
each term it lays down in the sense-to-sign play. Thought nonetheless forces or energizes
the instantiation of its terms on the semantic and semiotic registers.

We cannot

comprehensively observe if sense energizes thought or if thought energizes sense but we
can assert that a text is forced as an exceptional inception. Each term constitutes itself as
a microcosmic article and articulation of an asserted, anteed bet that the sign-sense term
may achieve “accurate,” “useful” and indeed powerful signification in the language
register. There would appear to be a certain monstrosity to any thought that would assert
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it can think at all. Thus our thought, here, in this text, would assert that this ante-posed
fact of thought’s monstrosity must include a radical due diligence and ongoing critique of
itself by itself of the most derivative components to its thinking, specifically the approach
to which we envision or must constantly re-vise thinking at all as potentiated on these
surface(s) of the meaning register.
These eccentric and more eccentric loops insinuate that discourse must claim an
inception, a beginning, when, indeed, we can discern only the traces of “where” or
“when” “it” began: the inception of thought is, of course, its radical exception. The
naming of this exceptional inception is already an ante-position – we must already
(“ante”) “pose” and “possess” and be possessed by our discourse in order to speak it: the
proposition(s) of thought require multiple pre-position(s) with which to pro-pose itself.
Yet, in observing the empirical metrics of the eccentric loop equations, we acknowledge
that “we,” as discursive subjects, are already “posed” and “possessed” by the equations
themselves.
This “ante-” concept, however, may illumine the complexity of the naming of this
exceptional inception. That is, “ante-” denotes a time/space reference, the “antenatal” or
“anteroom”129 into which sense and sign-sense have already been positioned or
insinuated in order to think itself as discursive thought. Indeed, can we “say,” or, in the
metrics of the equation, have we not already subsumed “what” is prior to thought by

129

1. Prior to; earlier: antenatal. 2. In front of; before: anteroom. [Latin, from ante, before; see ant- in Indo-European
roots. (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton
Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved; cf.
thefreedictionary.com.)

106

already being shaped in the metrics of the question itself? That is, what is thought’s
conceivable inception? Curiously, in language’s auto-eccentric (its abstracted sense) or
auto-energetic (its economic sense) play with its own thought, the address of this
“antenatal anteroom” is heard in its alter-native sense as “ante,” that is, the “ante”130
which the player/thinker must “put up” into the betting pool before receiving a hand of
cards – it is the “price to be paid” in order to play the game.
We cannot fully account for this exceptional inception but this exceptional
inception claims discourse. A hyper-vigilance cannot arrest the radical eccentricity of
sense/sign-sense but only “sense” and “sign-sense” “it.” However, curiously, a hypervigilance may offer to potentiate discourse as the sensed/sign-sensed and fore-grounded
instantiation of the term or proposition; at the same time it may potentiate the more
radical unfolding of the back-ground of thought in the disinstantiation of sense/sign-sense
discourse as a derivative of difference. Thus “called…” or “…not called…” “God…”
(or

any

exceptional

inception)

“…will

be

(the

copula/caesura

of

the

proposition)…there…” holds as the event horizon of thought but this exceptionally
incepted monstrosity makes us stutter.131 132

130

1. Games The stake that each poker player must put into the pool before receiving a hand or before receiving new
cards. See Synonyms at bet. 2. A price to be paid, especially as one's share; cost. (The American Heritage® Dictionary
of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published
by Houghton Mifflin Company; thefreedictionary.com.)
131

Creative stuttering is what makes language grow from the middle, like grass; it is what makes language a rhizome
instead of a tree, what puts language in perpetual disequilibrium. Ill Seen, Ill Said (content and expression). Being
well spoken has never been either the distinctive feature or the concern of great writers. (Deleuze, Giles, “He
Stuttered”, Gilles Deleuze Essays Critical & Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith & Michael A. Greco, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1997, 111).
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IV.

Towards a Theory of Semantic/Semiotic Exchange

Semantic Exchange
Rowing backwardly, like Dionysus on the frog pond, we observed that the
proposition “The leaf is green…” instances the sense of “leaf” and sense of “green” in
the disjunctive copula/caesura arrangement and that this arrangement sites the proposition
as one sensory field (the object leaf) in contrast to an alternative sensory field (the quality
green). The semantic arrangement derives both an abstraction of difference (object to
named object “leaf” contrasted with the shade of the object to color “green”) as well as
the energetic assertion of the verb “is.” Thus we note both a discursive or nominal
exchange of terms as well as the energetic exchange which pro-poses the terms as alternatives of their proposition.

We must contractually agree upon the validity of the

proposition before it is accepted and circulated in “common” parlance.
We can further observe the fixation of meaning by contract/consensus/circulation.
The anteed investment which pro-poses the terms “leaf” and “green” and “is” represent
the semantic instantiation of the “sense of…leaf…green…is…” from their sense to now
their sign-sense. Theoretically, this proposal generates the intelligibility we call the

132
…One of the most fascinating symbols of the absolute is Saccidānanda, a cumulative name with a dynamic
movement which takes you from reality (sad) to reality’s own conscious, shining depth (cit) and thence, continuing the
inward journey, to the profoundest center and source of reality itself which is bliss (ānanda), pure and infinite, the
ultimate truth of being.*(footnote: Sat-cit-āananda (reality or truth/mind or consciousness/bliss) become in
combination saccidāananda.)
The expression “Saccidānanda” seems to have arisen spontaneously from the heart of India’s seers,
when they tried to find some way of referring to the mystery which they intuited beyond the range of thought.
The welcome given to this term in the tradition undoubtedly proves its affinity to the Hindu soul . . . for many
hundreds of years it had been accepted in the spiritual vocabulary of India as one of the best symbols for the
innermost mystery of God himself, so far at least as man is capable of stammering about it.*
(Abhishiktananda, Saccidananda: A Christian Approach to Advaitic Experience, Delhi: I.S.P.C.K., 1974,
167.)
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“green leaf.” This semantic arrangement requires both an abstracting shift (from “sense”
to “sign-sense) but it also requires a semantic energetics. There is therefore an abstracted
exchange between the signs as well as an energetic exchange. Neither of these exchanges
may be fully accountable or comprehensible.

The abstracted exchange cannot be

objectively qualified because the terms of the proposition are already contingent upon the
use of other contingent terms in the semantic assemblage. The energetic exchange cannot
be objectively quantified because the energetics overlaps into the contingencies of the
abstracted exchange. The sense(s) and sign(s) of the terms are both contingent and cocontingent. However, order is generated, and we are already ante-posed in this order of
language as the transcendental contingency of the assemblage of language.
These hypothetical exchanges both express what we ante-pose as the semantic
order of the real but this order has already been passively generated in order to allow for
the conception of their ordering. Sense/sign-sense thought is already an exceptionally
incepted order before it is a semantic order.
Investment – Instantiation
Thus thought appears to be already a self-imposed spontaneous order of the
semantic register, the order of sense/sense-sign. This order has been imposed by the
ante-position of the instantiated sense-to-sign event which is achieved by both the anteposed abstraction of the sign but as well by a self-imposed energetic restraint. The anteposed abstracted term as well as the ante-posed energy of the exchange event have
passively generated an ordered investment which nonetheless becomes the active
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investment of a now imposed “order” to the world. The instantiated micro-order of the
semantic register potentiates the larger investment of the macro-order of the meaning
registers including, e.g., the “political” or “cultural” orders.
The semantic register thus both tends to originate passively but also to impose an
active register upon the macro-cultural orders. The naming of the world orders the world
and imposes a semantic dominion upon that named world.

Sense is not lost but

potentially radically expanded to a larger, more sense-energized potential order of its
sign-sense. We cannot discern either a “critical mass” or a non-liminal boundary for a
hypothetically “pure” sense to achieve sign-sense but rather both are ante-posed
senses/sign-senses which instantiate alter-native dimensions of a disjunctive composite.
We can just as easily posit that sense is expanded in the sign-sense register as to say it is
diminished because of the eccentric semantic and semiotic loops. Though sign-sense is
theoretically achieved by energetic restraint, its new expanded sense remains itself of
unlimited and indefinite potential and immeasurable energy: the severely repressive
rhetoric and politic of, e.g., Hitler’s 3rd Reich, nonetheless conquered or threatened to
conquer most of the Western world.
The macro orders are therefore seen as contingent upon the stability or
instabilities of the originating semantic register. Because the semantic macro-orders such
as politics and culture originate in the investment of the instantiated sense-to-sign or
sense/sign-sense micro-register they remain vulnerable to the investments of instantiation
as well as divestment of disinstantiation: culture derived from meaning registers may
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either prosper or decay. There must reside in the sense/sign-sense event the internal and
alternative exchange of investment to perpetuate the order of meaning.
Semiotic Exchange
…metaphor is essentially metamorphosis, and indicates how the two objects exchange
their determinations, exchange even the names which designate them, in the new medium
which confers the common quality upon them. Thus in Elstir’s painting, where the sea
becomes land, the land sea, where the city is designated only by “marine terms” and the
water by “urban terms.”* [*Proust, I, 835-837] This is because style, in order to
spiritualize substance and render it adequate to essence, reproduces the unstable
opposition, the original complication, the struggle and exchange of the primordial
elements which constitute essence itself.133
“Here in the usage of our language we must consider that the ending –ance is undecided
between active and passive.”134

As a young child Carl Jung, from the prominence of a large stone, inquired: “Am
I the one sitting on the stone or am I the stone upon which he is sitting?”

135

This

extraordinary soliloquy captures the radical yet ubiquitous siting of awareness because in
the subtle contrast of speakers we are posed with the question of how or if meaning
originates as a conjugate of the formation “I” but even more subtly how meaning
differentiates between its internal registers. Jung’s relaxation of the pretense of the pure
“I” allows sense to sense itself as an active and passive intra-sensed field, as the
exchange between an inflected sense as sense of itself and sense as sense of world as
world sensing. In Jung’s configuration sense is imaging itself as neutrally essential (e.g.,
Jung’s experiment pressured his sense to neutralize the weighting of its “subject sense”
133
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Deleuze, Proust & Signs, Deleuze, Gilles, Proust & Signs, New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1972, pp. 47-48.
Derrida, Difference, in Speech and Phenomena, pp. 136-137.
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Carl Jung, Memories Dreams Reflections, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, ed. Aniela Jaffé, New York: Vintage
Books, 1961, 20.
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and “predicate-stone/world-sense”) in the energetic momentum of its expression: that is,
its semantic/semiotic infrastructure abstracted to “I” as subject, “am sitting” as the
copula/caesura, and “on the stone” as predicate, can now be ordered in the flow of
subject/predicate but can also be inverted and re-ordered allowing the original predicate
to be expressed as the subject. The reader is left in the expressed conundrum of the
subversive energetics of subject/predicate or now “predicate” as “subject”, and vice
versa, in a hypothetically indefinite series. The child’s soliloquy sites the Mobius surface
of the stone-I as the subtle event of semantic and semiotic exchange and exchangeability
of the meaning figuration. The figuration of the stone-I-world is given literally in the
terms of the soliloquy, but the literal flow is disrupted and subverted to reveal a subtle
and essential order of meaning which renders either figuration – the “I on the stone” or
conversely “the I of the stone upon which he is sitting” – in play as now mere symptoms
of their only figured configuration in the terms. The literal semantic order is deliteralized
via the literal to reveal the force of the figuration as anterior to the literal, as its sub- or
sub-tle but also common Mobiusly looped surface. And we get to peek through the
child’s mind’s eye the exchangeability of meaning figurations and their attendant
energetics.
If we were chasing the tiger through the woods or over the stone, or if the tiger
was chasing us, we would be less concerned about the literalizable/deliteralizable
figuration of the I and the world and we would no doubt be using command literals (as
literal as possible!) to save our sweet semantic/semiotic asses, so to speak. Perhaps the
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stone-I-world instances in the pre-hunt (or post-hunt) and darkly figured cave rituals
whose traces we find figured on the stone walls of ancient homo-semanticus-semioticus?
Stones notwithstanding, and returning to our critical trajectory, we can observe
along with Deleuze that the determinations “…I and the stone” or the “boy and the stoneI…” “exchange their determinations…even the names which designate them…”
(footnote 133) and, when we are not chasing or being chased by the tiger, they confer
more or less “unstable oppositions.”

And, listening to Derrida’s observation, these

opposing terms and their figurations require passively and/or actively energized
momentums with which to be “held” or opposed in their figurations. And though the
semantic figurations may be only more or less energetically stable in their exchanges,
their ante-posed essence nonetheless may render the “birth of a world,” an exceptional
inception and a figuration of meaning. Such exceptional inceptions may or may not be
transparent to the question of their passive or active genesis, that is they may be only
more or less able to hear the child’s soliloquy in the heart and exchanges of their
expressions.
However, lurking in Jung’s stoned-world and in the ritualized tiger-world appears
not only the juxtaposition of the I/stone-I but the syntax and underlying energetics of the
definitive I and the in-definitive I. That is, if the “…‘I’ is the stone upon which ‘he’ is
sitting…” then the I now corresponds to the indefinite field of “…all that is not ▲”: the
figuring syntax subject/predicate has been ruptured to expose the always lurking and
potential “general equation” but now only as expressed symptom. If the “I” is the world
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or, for example, the full set of all possible time and space – if only figuratively or
metaphorically or symptomatically – then what has entered the limiting syntactical
structure is the unbounded possibility of “world.” At the same time, the syntax appears
to have lost or had suspended its limiting, organizing authority, and we thus find
ourselves thrust into the “world” of portmanteau expression, Alice or the figurement of
Alice in Wonderland, or the child Jung and the figurement of Jung in the stone-world.
Secondly, the subject and predicate are not posited as opposing one an-other but rather as
alternatives which arise in the figuration of the meaning proposition – that their syntax
may be inverted allays them as altering natives or alter-natives of a singular meaning
structure. This energetic inversion tends to subsume the hypothetical “other” to the
subset of the total text, that is it tends to subordinate alterity as constituted outside the
text to now constituted as an expression within the text: so-called “alterity” is now native
in the text as alter-native. Philosophies of alterity are thinkable yet they appear to
confuse the figuration of the semantic and semiotic order we have proposed: (a) They
remain expressed in the register which first potentiates alterity as at least partially
registered as sign-sense; (b) Then the term “alterity” appears to abstract and instantiate
its sense to an signed exceptional inception; (c) Which subjects it to a more or less
efficient energetics of its pressured terms in the register; and (d) The composite of which
further potentiates alterity as dis-instantiateable to the extent that this very composite
process is now exfoliated to its possible and also exceptionally excepted terms and
conditions. “Alterity” thus falls into the set of portmanteau terms which are themselves
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subject to the semantic and semiotic registers. Though portmanteau terms may express
“alterity” or “God” or “..that than which…” they do not exit the meaning register but
rather they remain instantiated as expressions of the sense/sign-sense register as part of
the exceptional inception of the order of thought. For Deleuze, The transcendental
remains textually empirical.

We are thus in league with Derrida’s assertion that

philosophy must re-vise its conceptualization of text as mere supplement to speech136;
this revision appears to be potentiated by the revival of not merely the question of how
we think we can express meaning in text but rather how the supplement is energized
within the semantic and semiotic registers as the limited and unlimited expression of the
full equation of difference, that is as the always implied if truncated “▲and all that is not
▲…”
Summary of Semantic/Semiotic Exchange: The pressure point of our soliloquy
(on I’s and stones and tigers) would be to consider an accounting of the semantic and
semiotic and now energetic registers which appear to be revealed in the exchange and
exchangeability of any proposed subject/copula/predicate.

Even if incomplete or

penultimate, such an accounting reveals the instability of any universal structure to
thought. That is, we have observed in our examination of the semantic surface the need
to account for the instantiation of the sensed object to what we have termed sign-sense
and we have termed this play the “ante” or the wager of sign-sense to speak or textualize
the objects of sense. There is an energetic exchange as objects of sense textualize to
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Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G.C. Spivak, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, pp. 6-7.
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sign-sense and this exchange may be observed to be more or less stable. However, the
play of sign-sense is itself always in the play of the general equation of language or the
assemblage of other alternative senses.

But this observation is always potentiated

(whether acknowledged or unacknowledged) by the convergence of sense and sign-sense
as the exceptional inception of thought derived from the general equation of difference or
“▲and all that is not ▲…” The text “▲” appears not be fully comprehensible or
composite without “…and all that is not ▲.”
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VI. Summary and Implications
Every historical rupture, every advent of a new master-signifier, changes retroactively the
meaning of all tradition, restructures the narration of the past, makes it readable in
137
another, new way.

Returning to our thesis statements, we may observe:
If Anselm’s, or Shaikh Ahmad Al-‘Alawī’s, or Lonergan’s statements express the
term ‘God,’ then this term may be read as the backgrounding “boundedness” of the third
term of “religio” and furthermore may be understood as the desire for the complete
epistemological condition of thought; language expresses this condition in statements of
‘meaning.’
If ‘religion’ expresses this desire in texts and ritual practice, and this ‘third term’
is understood as the condition of being ‘bounded to or by,’ then the study of religion is
itself bounded to this desire for the completion of thought, and its study requires the
continuous and radical epistemological interrogation of its expressions in the semantic
and semiotic registers.
Following Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, this desire for the complete
epistemological condition of thought cannot be understood as an ‘alterity’ of thought but
is rather the internal native or ‘alter-native’ condition of thought itself.
The ‘religions’ constitute in native texts and ritual practices this desire to know
and express this complete condition. While they appear to each claim an exceptional
inception to the expression, because the expression emerges from the energetic and
unstable disjunctive synthesis of difference each expression appears therefore to be
137
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rendered unstable and open to differentiation. As such, each religion expresses itself as a
‘singularity’ of this universal condition of thought. However, because of the native
factors in the epistemological condition, specifically, that thought desires but cannot fully
express the condition, no particular religion can claim hegemony to the expression of the
condition: ‘God’ as such is the full expression of thought, yet by the ‘definition’ of the
terms of thought, its expression remains fully its alter-native exception to thought.
Finally, the academic study of religious texts and rituals would appear to be
incomplete and epistemologically nonsensical without their third native term, religio as
“bounded to or by.”

An internal semiotic symptomatology pervades the semantic

register: the terms of the text and ritual are always called by the “sacred.” There persists
a bounded and unbounded theological imperative to the discipline.
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